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JPRS-EPS-85-017

2 February 1985

# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19980302 128

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2 February 1985

**EAST EUROPE REPORT**  
**POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**CONTENTS**

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

Armed Forces Political Head Cites 1985 Training Goals (VOLKSARMEE, No 48, 1984).....	1
---	---

**HUNGARY**

Training of Young Officers in Military (Ferenc Papp; PARTELET, No 12, 1984).....	6
Survey Attempts To Measure Students' Political Orientation (Geza Denke; FELSOOKTATASI SZEMLE, No 84).....	11
Youth Problems: Resolutions Seen as Key to Future (Laszlo Thoma Interview; MAGYAR IFJUSAG, 28 Dec 84).....	18
Financing, Improvement of Social Entitlements Still Unresolved (Gyorgy Szepesi; FIGYELO, 6 Dec 84).....	23
Preliminary Figures for 1981-1985 Changes in CPI (Mihaly Zafir; HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, No 49, 8 Dec 84).....	27
New Hungarian Magazines Reflect Economic Reforms (Kirsten Bruun; INFORMATION ONSDAG, 7 Nov 84).....	33

**POLAND**

Priest Views Attack as 'Terrorist Robbery' (Aleksander Checko; ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 8-9 Dec 84).....	38
Leaders Send Message to PRK on Chan Si's Death (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 4 Jan 85).....	41
Kuron Comments on Present Political Situation (Jacek Kuron; EL PAIS, 27 Dec 84).....	42

Attitudes, Responsibilities of CPSU Members Explained (TRYBUNA LUDU, 8 Jan 85).....	48
Kohl's, Vogel's Ostpolitik Compared (POLITYKA, No 48, 1 Dec 84).....	51
Postponement of Trip by Genscher, by Henryk Zdanowski Vogel Supports Continuity in Relations, Hans-Jochen Vogel Interview	
Capture of 'Old Stalinist' Stimulates Political Debate (TU I TERAZ, No 48, 28 Nov 84; POLITYKA, No 49, 1 Dec 84) ..	55
Mijal's Political Career Mijal's Split With Party, by Marian Turski	
<b>YUGOSLAVIA</b>	
'Egoism' of 'Reaganomics' Said To Impoverish World (Aleksandr Borcic; KOMUNIST, 11 Jan 85).....	64
Health Implications of Economic Crisis Explored (Slaven Letica; START, No 411, 20 Oct 84).....	66
Self-Management Law Termed Ineffective (Ivica Colak; BORBA, 29-30 Dec 84).....	74
BORBA Publishes Refutation of Suvar Article (Dragan Veselinov; BORBA, 26, 27 Dec 84).....	75

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

ARMED FORCES POLITICAL HEAD CITES 1985 TRAINING GOALS

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 48, 1984 (signed to press 27 Nov 84)  
p 3

[From the speech of Col Gen Heinz Kessler, member, SED Central Committee, deputy minister for national defense and chief, NVA (National People's Army) Political Main Administration to the Ninth Plenary Session of the SED Central Committee: "With Word and Deed Soldiers Stand by Our Peace Policy"]

[Text] Comrades!

Members of the NVA and GDR border troops in staff organizations, troop units, detachments and installations are intensively and comprehensively preparing for the 1984/85 training year that will begin on 1 December. Their engaged, initiative-marked action expresses gratitude to the Central Committee of our party and to its Secretary General, Comrade Erich Honecker, for the high praise and appreciation of the achievements in the defense of socialism and peace in the 35th year of the GDR.

For the NVA, the GDR border troop, and civil defense their anniversary year of our republic was the most successful one in their history. As Army General Heinz Hoffmann, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and minister for national defense stated at the commanders' meeting on 26 October 1984, they fulfilled their class mission with the unprecedented growth in combat power, combat and mission readiness in alliance with the Soviet Army and other fraternal armies. Our country's air space and borders were reliably guarded through conscientious duty performance in the active service system, in combat and border service.

Good and excellent achievements were recorded in political and combat training and were verified in numerous tests. Troop and command post exercises, including major exercises with Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovakian comrades in arms, have demonstrated increased military mastery by NVA commanders, staff organs, and troops. They show the advanced level of cooperation of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and the unbreakable class and military brotherhood that welds the armies of the socialist defensive alliance together.

NVA and GDR border troop members stand with word and deed by the active peace policy of our party and our state. This is expressed in a daily striving for high combat readiness under the most effective use of resources available to us. Savings of M122 million as well as M81 million of work performed by army members for the national economy are expressions of these constant exertions.

#### Competition Aimed at High Combat Power and Battle Readiness

Everything we have achieved in the 35th year of the GDR has been the result of the purposeful leadership of the SED, the exemplary action by tens of thousands of communists the mobilizing enthusiasm of FDJ members, and the preparedness of army members and border troops.

Creative thinking and acting, initiative and responsibility were characteristics of the mass movement of socialist competition that, more purposefully than ever before, was concentrated on increased combat power and battle readiness.

At this time all the thoughts and desires of army members and border troops are directed at the successful start of the new training year. Being that it is the last year of the five year plan and one of preparation for the 11th Party Congress it will undoubtedly provide further mighty impulses to the struggle for maximum performance in guarding socialism and protecting peace. As defenders of the revolutionary achievements of the people and of their peaceful future they are fully aware of the responsibility they have been assigned at the side of their comrades in arms of the Warsaw Pact.

Based on our party's analysis of the international situation and its tendencies, the demands and tasks of training year 85 take into account the fact that the danger of an outbreak of a war with or without mass destruction weapons has increased to a perilous degree through the sole fault of the rulers of the U.S. and NATO. The tasks meet the NVA's international obligation to contribute within the framework of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact to maintenance of the military-strategic balance between socialism and imperialism, the foiling of aggressive NATO plans, and preservation of peace. From this we come to the conclusion that an increased education in socialist patriotism in unity with proletarian internationalism is an important matter in politico-ideological work.

Love of the homeland, of the socialist fatherland, is a strong, activating emotion that triggers a high degree of conscious activity to guard against any imperialist threat. It is all the more profound since army members and border troops realize that socialist fatherland is identical with a political rule of the working class and its allies, an elimination of exploitation and suppression, a socialist democracy, freedom and human dignity. In preparing for the 11th Party Congress we want to make our army members and border troops more and more aware of what we have accomplished in the almost 40 years under the leadership of the party of the working class, and that has been embodied in the socialist German Democratic Republic.

## Alliance With the Soviet Army

Education in socialist patriotism is inseparably linked to strengthening socialist internationalism. In impending 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerian fascism and the liberation of the German people from fascism, and the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Pact are worthy occasions for making NVA members and GDR border troops even more fully aware of the liberating mission of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War, and of the marvelous achievements of the Soviet people and their army and navy in the struggle for social progress and lasting peace since the days in May 1945.

This unshakeable friendship with the USSR, based on the iron alliance between the CPSU and our SED and permeated by the spirit of socialist internationalism has its military expression in the armed comradeship between the Soviet forces and the NVA. This comradeship in arms is and will remain an unceasing source for the combat power and battle readiness of our forces.

By setting ourselves a 1984/85 training year task to further develop the ideological steeling of army members and border troops we are following the Leninist realization that as the scope of historical events grows, interest and a conscious attitude toward them must increase. For us in the armed forces the strengthening of a socialist consciousness is the key to the unconditional fulfillment of the task of the workers' and peasants' power, of every order.

Since the political and military demands on the combat power and battle readiness of the NVA have increased considerably due to the tense politico-military situation and the vigorous growth of NATO psychological warfare, we must constantly enable army members to recognize all factors in combat readiness in all their complexity and mutual influence, and to bring them into play in the daily service with a high degree of effectiveness.

It is obvious--NATO propaganda centers want to spread fear and doubt in our power, and at the same time further carelessness. Their talk of the peace-preserving role of the NATO troops, to include the Bundeswehr, turns the truth upside down. Our soldiers are all too aware that it depends on their military exertions whether the opponent will face a mortal risk in case of aggression.

We shape the entire ideological, political, and military education and training so that our army members are morally and physically in good shape, are sure in the mastery of their weapons even in stressful surroundings, and are able to fight on until victory with an unbendable will.

In the basic documents for the 1984/85 training year we place the greatest stress in the work of commanders, staffs, political organizations and the FDJ on:

--the further development of the politico-military standard as a pre-requisite for creative mass initiatives and an iron military discipline;

--an increase in the quality of troop command on the basis of most recent scientific findings, and to even more comprehensively train command organs, troop and fleet members for action as part of a coalition;

--operative, tactical and combat training that is realistic and effective, and on realistic and exact evaluation of training results;

--the constant improvement of the appropriate quality of combat readiness;

--the mastery of weapons and combat equipment in the shortest possible time, and the making of full use of their combat potential;

--the comprehensive and intensive study of the concepts and aims of the potential aggressor, and

--the further improvement of the relationship between expense and results in the organization and execution of military tasks, and the achievement of a high level of material and energy conservation as well as the highest effectiveness in the use of material and financial resources.

Within the NVA, the GDR border troops, and civil defense great exertions have been made in recent weeks to achieve the highest possible results from the very first day of the training year.

Within military collectives thorough discussion of competitive programs has begun on the basis of the assigned missions. The comrades of the Stecher artillery battery, the Kleine fighter squadron, the rocket speedboat "Otto Tost," the Riedel border company have set an example in this. There are meaningful projects in the construction engineer troops and the combat engineer battalions, among civilian employees in warehousing and vehicle maintenance, as well as in reservist units.

Intensive work is also underway at our training institutions, in order that an ever greater contribution to the increased combat power and battle readiness of the NVA and the GDR border troops may be made by communist education and military qualification of the cadre, as well as by research activities.

Leadership of socialist competition demands much from every superior. Chiefs, commanders, and supervisors are responsible for explaining in close cooperation with FDJ and trade union leaderships the tasks contained in the socialist competition, for furthering the acceptance of voluntary and forward-oriented obligations, and for creating the required preconditions for meeting them.

The Class Task Will Always be Met

Based on the initiative of the masses we will assure the required tempo in developing combat power and battle readiness, and thus assure the continuity in training as well as the optimal use of all available means.

We can assure the Central Committee of our party and its Secretary General, Comrade Erich Honecker, with full conviction that the communists in the NVA and GDR border troops are facing the challenges of coming times optimistically and confidently. They are striving to implement the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party in military life at a high level. In this vein we are further qualifying the leadership ability of the leading party organs. They must exert even more effective influence on increasing combat power in the basic organizations, as well as on their masses-related working style, on an ideologically demanding intra-party life, and on a high political activity by communists within the ranks of the FDJ, the trade union of the civilian employees, and the Vorwaerts army sports union.

In this way we will succeed in meeting the class mission assigned by the party and always do justice to our patriotic and internationalist duty. I give my full approval to the report of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee, to the orienting explanations of Comrade Erich Honecker.

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CSO: 2300/189

HUNGARY

TRAINING OF YOUNG OFFICERS IN MILITARY

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 12, 84 pp 84-88

[Article by Ferenc Papp, lieutenant colonel, party secretary of party committee 5011, in the Hungarian People's Army (NH): "Career Beginnings of Young Officers"]

[Text] In our higher-level unit 47 percent of the officers and 64 percent of the non-commissioned officers are less than 30 years old. The varied and highly responsible tasks of the young career soldiers make it understandable that our party committee, the base organizations, as well as the commanders are paying particular attention to their work. This political-ideological and professional military activity is bent upon, in the first place, strengthening their sense of vocation and teaching them those professional techniques which are necessary to handle the technological devices they use and to train the young enlisted men they are in charge of, both in politics and in military matters.

In our efforts to help them adapt themselves and start their careers, we the commanders of a higher level unit always keep in mind that the basic military laws are: the single-person commander system, the existence of strict dependence relations, and the execution of the commands and instructions to the best of one's knowledge. Closely connected with these principles are mutual respect, comradely helpfulness to each other, strict unity of duties and rights and community life. Adaptation means, first of all, the recognition and acceptance of the tasks, value system, particular community features, and the environment in a narrower sense of a given military community. This can be eased by us if we make it clear what the duties of military service are. At the same time we provide in many ways the proper conditions and organization of the service and respect the free exercise of the rights stipulated by the code of rules.

The nature and extent of the demands placed upon professional servicemen are well defined. Basically, they have to adopt the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, to know and understand, on the basis of their ideological training, the policy of our party, and to be able to convincingly propagate it. They have to get the enlisted men under their command to acquire high level military and political knowledge during their period of service, and the units to be formed so as to help perform armed services and also efficiently contribute to the soldiers' preparation for life.

An important task is the learning of military profession, since the proper harnessing of the possibilities provided by modern arms and military technology depends basically on the training and skill of both commanders and operators. Thus it is not irrelevant to what extent the young officers' and non-commissioned officers theoretical knowledge yields fruits in the practice, and how fast it becomes practical ability.

The party committee of higher level units has defined--on the basis of many years of experience--their tasks in helping the career beginners. These experiences have shown that the relationship of young technicians, commanders and experts with their profession has been essentially influenced by their reception in the army, and by the degree of patience and helpfulness displayed by their commanders and comrades-in-arms toward them. The commanders, political and party activists and secretaries of the base organizations maintain a dialogue with those influencing professional career beginners. Such conversations provide an opportunity of giving the beginners information about their military units and sub-units, activities of the party and KISZ [Communist Youth Federation] organizations, and they help arouse interest in the local service functions. They also assist the local commanders in acquiring a more accurate picture about the training, thoughts on life, feelings and attitudes towards work of the young career beginners, and in learning the extent of their attachment to the profession, their familiarity with party and public life and their personal ideas. On the basis of these data the authorities streamline the methods to be followed and the concrete party assignments to each individual case. In this work and in the shaping of the tasks it is of great help that the career beginners usually speak sincerely about their aspirations and experiences. It is further a great advantage that 65-70 percent of the young officers and 25-30 percent of the non-commissioned officers are leaving school as members of the party.

The party committee and the basic party organizations are paying particular attention to the political party training of the young career soldiers. It is also easier for them to acquire professional knowledge if they join the party. As a consequence of the fast fluctuation in the sub-units, the career beginners quickly assume party and KISZ functions, they become KISZ secretaries, leading members of the basic party organizations and often even party secretaries. The non-party members among the young professional soldiers are being taken into account by the party organizations for future party development, and therefore their work is assessed also from this point of view. The party and KISZ organizations are well aware of the fact that if they manage to encourage these young people to become members of the movement, party members and true elements in the local political environment, they fulfill an essential military and political requirement.

#### Careful Survey

The higher level unit provides--as a result of its professional military duty--standing services of alert. This demands a well organized and dedicated work from the entire personnel, from the commanders to the young enlisted men. The seriousness of this task requires from young officers and non-commissioned officers as well that they develop full-fledged, self-supporting activities.

The situation is complicated by the fact that our troops are housed--outside the large settlements--in so-called remote garrisons. This entails the need of providing educational, housing, cultural, catering and shopping facilities for the soldiers.

In compliance with a suggestion of the party committee, we have discussed at various panels the best ways and means to promote the early start of independent activities and to ease a smooth accommodation with the military environment. We have managed to reduce stress by establishing a hierarchy of the tasks and by introducing graduation in the work assignments and carefully planned deputizing.

An important part of the educational activities of the party and political organizations is the one which focuses on the formation of the ideas and political activities of the commanders and senior associates in order to educate them to react seriously and patiently to their young comrades' statements, opinions, and attempts at self-definition. What is important in this is that such exchanges of opinions should serve the political enlightenment and professional military, commander-oriented development of the young career soldiers, and that they obtain substantial and meaningful answers to their questions and proposals and convincing explanations concerning their errors. And, since in our higher level unit the commanders of battalions and companies are predominantly young officers, and since in this area we find the fewest party members, it is indispensable that experienced communists, who are active in the commanding staff, should help map the military and political activities of the sub-units.

It is no contradiction to all this that in certain places and during some tense periods of time no time or energy is left for the individual treatment of the young officers and non-commissioned officers; it may happen that they come immediately in the thick of life. It also happens that the authorities are impatient toward them, that they at once have to meet hard requirements and at times they are at once called to account. Keeping all this in mind, our party committee enjoined the commanders, party organizations and individual communists to improve the methods of individual treatment and care of the young career soldiers. By strengthening the humanitarian, tactful, patient, mutually respectfull and careful character of problem solving it would soon be realized that the relations between commanders and subordinates is a political question of high importance. Only those commanders can obtain lasting results who are nurturing correct and principles relations with their subordinates, who are always able to win their cooperation in their plans and aspirations. It is rather reassuring for us that the majority of the commanders are men who pay careful attention to assisting and educating the young soldiers.

Working efficiency achievements and prestige of those influencing young careers are reflected in the following facts: within 2 or 3 years after graduation from the colleges about 70-75 percent of the young officers are promoted to higher positions, most of them becoming company commanders. After 4 or 5 years of service, we recommend each year 12 to 15 persons for entry into a domestic or foreign military academy. A yearly average of 4 to 6 officers or non-commissioned officers are sent abroad, as a reward for

their excellent performance in their professional tasks, their outstanding social and party activities, and for their results obtained in socialist competitions. Of the officers and non-commissioned officers 75 to 80 percent yearly receive achievement and financial recompensation for their work, and during the last 5 years only 4 percent of them had to undergo disciplinary procedures.

#### Social Conditions

Commanders of the higher level units are effectively dealing with the social problems of the military and civilian cadres. This work is based on those commands and instructions of the minister of defense which regulate, among other things, the training in successively higher positions of such young officers who graduated with outstanding qualifications from the colleges and who displayed excellent performance in drills and under inspections. Specific arrangements are also made to financially support starting of families in the form of loans, help for the employment of wives, accommodation of children, vacationing and leisure time of the officers and non-commissioned officers, programs for adult education, etc.

One of the important problems at the beginning of a career and a life is housing, the accommodation of new arrivals. In the garrisons of higher level units there are always so-called bachelor hostellries or apartments converted for this purpose. Married career soldiers are getting service quarters within a year or so.

The problems of housing are solved in this way. We also want to make the housing conditions more comfortable and attractive, so that our young people find themselves indeed at home, thus refining their taste in decorating and increasing their interest in and responsibility for their immediate environment.

We also have to help our unmarried officers and non-commissioned officers to spend their leisure time appropriately and usefully. Because of their standing alert service duties, the career officers cannot leave the garrison every weekend. In the beginning this is a cause for serious concern among the young people. It is the responsibility of the commanders and political organizations to ensure them entertainment and active leisure. It is a proof of the active work of the basic political and party organizations that in the remote garrisons the club libraries, which also lend books to the civilian population, are doing a very good job. The basic party organizations also see to it that not only unmarried young soldiers should perform weekend duties with the motto "they have time anyway." We try to divide justly and equally the burden of service even in this respect.

It is a natural law of life that considerable numbers of young soldiers are starting families at the beginning of their careers. Both the party organizations and the commanders are duty bound to help the young soldiers carry this "double burden." The recommendation concerning the size of a long-term family allowance requires a great deal of circumspection. Only on the basis of an in-depth knowledge of the social conditions, way of life, saving

habits and financial background of the young would-be married can a meaningful decision be made. At our higher level unit 94 family men received loans in the amount of 10,000 to 25,000 forints during the last 4 years.

In view of this specific situation, the commanders and party organizations are continuously helping the wives explore their employment possibilities and coordinating them with their training and personal ambitions. In the smaller garrisons the employment of wives with higher education in their own profession is usually problematic. Often they can find an appropriate job only in another area or nearby town. This is a handicap for certain military families since commuting to and from the job entails expenses and loss of time. The children cannot always be accommodated in the area in which their parents live. But, as a result if good cooperation with the area authorities and social organizations, military families have no difficulty in finding accommodation for their children in nurseries, kindergartens and schools.

Most expenses for the transportation and supervision of the children are assumed by the army. Married young career soldiers welcome and are even soliciting this kind of careful and tactful help from their employers.

Of course, these cannot be one-way processes. The support to soldiers beginning their careers and starting families can only be then successful if they are not only passive beneficiaries of these initiatives. The quick growth of their sense of vocation, attachment to their career and commitment to it for life are necessarily the results of a joint effort by the authorities and the young career soldiers, who will develop strong communities and balanced comradely ties. Thus, in most cases their private lives also evolve harmoniously.

The coordinated, multilateral activities of commanders and party organizations have contributed to the fact that the young officers and non-commissioned officers are making up a respected sector of the professional cadres. Their political activities and public work are playing an important role in the political and party activities of the sub-units. A significant part of the young officers are quickly acquiring the training and practice for the performance of their job. Their sense of vocation and ties with the military career are becoming affirmed, and they are becoming ever more competent for assuming higher assignments.

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HUNGARY

SURVEY ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE STUDENTS' POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Budapest FELSOOKTATASI SZEMLE in Hungarian Nov 84 pp 662-667

[Article by Dr Geza Denke, university professor, Budapest Technical University:  
"Experiences in the Political Orientation Education of University Students"]

[Text] 1. Goal, Character and Method of the Survey

Beginning with school year 1975-1976 at the Budapest Technical University we have prepared a survey every 2 years about experiences in the political orientation education of the students and the development of the political attitude profile of the students. We conducted the most recent survey--the fifth--at the end of the first semester for school year 1983-1984, making use of the good experiences of the surveys thus far.

An important interest of the state and social organizations of the university attaches to being continually informed or getting a faithful picture of the results of and experiences with political orientation education of the students, in the interest of setting the proper tasks for increasing effectiveness.

We used a number of coordinated methods in the course of the survey: We used a questionnaire method, and we took into consideration the opinion of a selected circle of Marxism-Leninism instructors, class leaders and special subject instructors.

We distributed three types of questionnaires in the course of the questionnaire survey. Randomly selected students filled out one of the three questionnaires. The questionnaires differed from one another in their themes: The theme of the "A" questionnaire was the socio-political and economic situation of our country. That of the "B" questionnaire was public life activity, political activity and KISZ work. That of the "C" questionnaire was the engineering career, engineers' training and the status of the technical profession. A section containing personal data was attached to each questionnaire (sex, year, school, residence, movement membership, etc.) but the questionnaires were to be returned without a name. The opinions requested from the class leaders, Marxism-Leninism instructors and special subject instructors also contained the problems included in the questionnaires.

Because of its complexity, many components and many strata we could not have as a goal a "full" study of the ideological-political profile of the students. We selected the themes contained in the three questionnaires for essentially two reasons. On the one hand they touched on problems that are closely interdependent with our instruction and education work and occupy a significant place in the development of the ideological-political profile of the students. On the other hand the earlier studies dealt largely with these areas and so it was possible to make comparisons.

We sent the three questionnaires three times to 600 students. The questionnaires were sent as letters and returned in the same way. The number of returned filled-out questionnaires was: 382 for questionnaire "A"; 356 for questionnaire "B"; and 402 for questionnaire "C". In the case of 13 questionnaires we could not identify school or year.

Total of Returned and Measurable Questionnaires (Questionnaires A, B and C)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Const.</u>	<u>Mech.</u>	<u>Archt.</u>	<u>Chem.</u>	<u>Electr.</u>	<u>Transp.</u>	<u>Total</u>
I.	76	92	40	39	122	93	462
III.	59	48	21	24	153	50	355
V.	60	44	26	27	114	39	310
Total	195	184	87	90	389	182	1,127

The sample was 31 percent of year I, 30 percent of year III, 27 percent of year V, or 29 percent of the total.

The ratio of questionnaires returned (62 percent) can be called good and it reflects the willingness of the students to express political and economic opinions, even if a few questionnaires were turned in not filled out.

The questionnaires contained open questions and also those to which only textual answers could be given. We got sincere answers also to these questions, which could be well utilized from the viewpoint of the survey. More than 60 percent of those returning the "A" questionnaires answered questions posed in this fashion as well.

The questionnaires returned provide an adequate foundation for representing university students as a sample and the composition of them according to school and year.

In the interest of a more conclusive survey of the political attitude profile of the students we asked--as we have mentioned already--for the opinion of Marxism-Leninism instructors, class leaders and special subject instructors according to positions given in advance in a specific area.

In general it could be established that the answers given to the questionnaires and the reports of the class leaders, Marxism-Leninism instructors and special subject instructors are essentially in harmony, with minor differences, and give a similar picture of the political attitude profile of the students.

Our goal with the questionnaire survey was to find out what the students thought of the inquired themes which would serve as a basis for setting tasks, not for grading with the students, for example, instruction, the economic situation, KISZ work or the activity of the Marxism-Leninism instructors.

## 2. Students' Opinions About the Economic and Socio-Political Situation in Our Country

The students see very well the interdependencies of economic efficiency, work discipline and wage payment and the necessity of reducing incomes not deriving from work. In the judgment of the majority, however, the situation in this area is not worse than in the preceding 1 or 2 years. Some see the cause of the deficiencies in the weakness or inconsistency of leadership, others in the lack of adequate material incentive and still others in a harmful "humanism" following from the system, which overlooks too much and is harmful to society as a whole. Many blame the external, unfavorable circumstances for the difficulties. It must be seen also that in the course of bringing up the deficiencies it was said on a number of occasions that this or that one involves an unavoidable "crisis" of socialism, its necessarily lower economic efficiency or the impossibility of making up for the disadvantages.

With significant frequency--especially in connection with the economic situation--the situation was called better "as compared to the socialist countries", which on the one hand has the effect of a constraint and on the other hand appears as a boast.

In general many spoke of our economic situation with anxiety. A small number are very pessimistic. Some of the pessimistic answers cite the lack of greater political activity in a characteristic way.

To the question: "Does the increase in the number of private undertakings affect the socialist character of our homeland?" Sixty-five percent of the respondents answered no and 24 percent answered yes, because it does not affect ownership of the basic tools of production but does improve the competition situation. Eighty-one percent of the respondents approved of the formation of the enterprise work associations founded at large enterprises, but they also referred to their disadvantageous aspects. There was even the observation: "Is this not the rebirth of capitalism?"

In connection with prices, 71 percent of the respondents approved of an increase in the price level which would be accompanied by a suitable increase in the wage level.

More than half of the respondents attribute a substantial role to unemployment in increasing work discipline and efficiency. This is 13 percent higher as compared to the 1977-1978 survey.

Of the respondents 42 percent agreed and 33 percent disagreed with the statement "Materialism holds back the development of socialist awareness".

The majority of the respondents (94 percent) feel that it is possible to preserve our achievements by raising the level of our work. Of those questioned 67 percent say that we can maintain the standard of living achieved only with more efficient work.

Virtually everyone (82 percent) agrees that "there is a need for a coordinated division of labor among the socialist countries" but the majority (68 percent) also feel that "the division of labor within CEMA does not correspond to our goals in every respect". There was uncertainty in judging whether "the division of labor which has developed among the socialist countries is advantageous for us." The most frequent answer category here was "yes and no."

Of the responding students 49 percent agree with some reservations with the statement that "in Hungary everyone can express his opinion in political, social and economic questions" and 15 percent said they did not agree with this at all. The great majority (78 percent) agree that it is correct if "the law forbids incitement against our socio-economic order" and only 2 percent "do not agree with this at all."

The majority consider the work of our mass media adequate. The picture is more favorable in regard to domestic information than it is in regard to international information. At the same time there are questions about which many (63 percent) feel that not enough information is provided. Such questions, for example, as the internal socio-economic situation of the Soviet Union, the armaments policy of the Warsaw Pact, CEMA problems, etc.

In addition to the weaknesses of our information system the answers--presumably--reflect the fact that foreign radio transmissions, etc. are especially effective when they seem well informed and factual on points which our media ignore.

There is definite agreement (72 percent) in the politically important question that "we can make the situation of Hungarian nationalities living in other countries more favorable by making more profound the friendship with their countries."

Unfavorable phenomena of our society are condemned with a desire to improve things--corruption, income acquisition without working, materialism, trickery, bureaucracy, etc. (more than 75 percent)--but it is also believed almost unanimously that corruption and income acquisition without working are not decreasing in our homeland. They seek the positive aspects of socialism, they want to know the values of socialism better, and the majority are opposed to views alien to socialism (selfishness, subjectivism, etc.).

The problem of religion, of idealism and materialism, does not concern the great majority of the responding students, which is probably the consequence of the ordered relationship between church and state. It could be interpreted as meaning that religion is losing its significance, if slowly. According to 55 percent of the respondents religious feeling is declining among the youth and 62 percent reject the view that "the decline of religion leads to relaxing social morality." According to the great majority of respondents

(81 percent) religious feeling is compatible with the engineering profession or a leadership position. We should note here that fewer and fewer of the respondents consider it important that a technical expert should have a strong Marxist orientation. In 1976, 77 percent of the students answered yes to this question; in 1978, 66 percent did; in 1981, 15 percent did; and in 1983 the ratio was 15 percent again.

Definite disagreement (66 percent) was the answer to the statement that "social differences in Hungary are not too great." The majority (67 percent) feel that "some people in Hungary have inexcusable amounts of property." Many feel that "the income and property differences which have developed here are not compatible with socialism."

### 3. Opinions About Public Life Activity, Political Activity and KISZ Work

Ninety percent of the students questioned feel that the political sphere affects everyone and no one should excuse himself from its influence, and also according to 90 percent political information is an organic part of general culture. It must be evaluated positively that according to 50 percent of the students everyone must take a stand in politics. At the same time, 28 percent rejected this. This was also the situation in the 1981 survey.

According to 45 percent of the respondents the relationship to politics can be ignored when judging a technical expert, but 35 percent think the other way.

The majority do not consider the effectiveness, methods or results of attitude education work at the university satisfactory; this picture of the situation has not improved since 1981. Contributing to this is the fact that the conditions (domestic and foreign) for political orientation education work have deteriorated more than they have improved. However, according to more than 70 percent of the students social science and political training should be part of university training.

The picture is not favorable in judging the role of the KISZ; its influence is decreasing. According to 70 percent of the respondents KISZ work consists only of carrying out what is prescribed by higher authorities; about the same number consider the KISZ to be "what its members make it." According to about 40 percent of the students questioned there is much forced political activity in the KISZ. Among the students there is a serious unsatisfied need for a good community.

According to the survey, protection of interests stands in first place in the work of the KISZ; the level of this is below expectations, but not as much as 2 years ago. Those questioned consider the fact that the KISZ fills free time and educates party members to be the best realized of its tasks, the worst realized are its functions in political education and community development.

Three quarters of the students feel that our public life is not more democratic than before; according to 40 percent of them our political arrangements do not reflect the will of the citizens. But according to the majority of the respondents there has been progress in a number of areas.

According to those questioned democratism is manifested most of all in public life, in the freedom to express opinions and in legality.

According to the majority of the students democracy at the university is greater than "in life". In answer to the question: "Has there been unpleasantness resulting from expressing opinions at the university?" the answer was "No" in a high percentage (80-90 percent).

According to the questioned students, student representation is most effective in protecting interests (74 percent), in judging the activity of instructors (59 percent) and in improving contacts between instructors and students.

According to 44-45 percent the activity of party-member students is exemplary in political debates and in KISZ work. According to the 1978 survey 40 percent of those questioned did not know any party-member students; this number today is 24 percent. But it also appears from the answers given to the questions that on the basis of their behavior or political preparation 36 or 26 percent of the students respectively do not consider the party-member students as exemplary.

#### 4. Opinions Concerning Engineering and Various Questions of Instruction

Among the reasons for choosing the career 49 percent gave first place to interest in technical problems; technical abilities figured in second place with 40 percent; in third place, with 32 percent, was the fact that achievements in secondary school made only this possible.

It is unfavorable that so few (6 percent) consider graduation from the Budapest Technical University as giving status.

It is not reassuring in regard to selection of a career that only 57 percent of the respondents would choose the same school today and only 67 percent would choose a technical career while about 20 percent would not go to the university (this figure was only 5 percent in 1981).

A fairly significant number of the questioned students found the study material, the level of instruction and the social and party life at the university more unfavorable than they had anticipated.

The questioned students consider basic knowledge, general culture and knowing how to get along with people to be important; they agree with the goal of training experts who are open to socio-economic-political questions. According to the majority of them the students should become better acquainted with the working world during their university years (74 percent). Seventy-six percent of the questioned students agreed that it is not enough for an engineer to be concerned with his profession alone: he must also favorably influence and educate people with his personal example.

Criticism of Marxism-Leninism instruction at the university has become stronger and nearly 40 percent of the students do not consider the ideological and systematic orientation education of the Marxism-Leninism instruction satisfactory. Only 13 percent of those questioned agree that the Marxism-Leninism subjects play a significant role in developing one's worldview; at the same time, more than 50 percent consider it satisfactory or partly satisfactory.

According to the questioned students the most important factors influencing the development of the ideological and political profile are the circle of friends, the family and the mass media, that is, factors outside the university. This was also reflected in the 1981 survey.

Compared to the findings of the 1981 survey the political orientation profile of the students as a whole has not essentially changed in a positive or negative direction. But the view of the situation has differentiated--it is more favorable in places and less favorable in others.

We must regard it as a significant achievement that even when the external and internal circumstances became worse and more unfavorable we succeeded in seeing to it--with greater efforts than in earlier years--that the political orientation profile of the students did not substantially deteriorate.

The majority of the students judge the political mood, the political situation of our country, to be good. Relatively little political disillusionment can be found. But the awakening to the existence of an internal "opposition" can be sensed; this--it appears--is one of the most characteristic changes compared to the 1981 survey, even if it extends to very few youths in comparative terms. It can also be established that among the students there are apolitical individuals in significant numbers. They, naturally, are not in opposition.

The sincere mood of wanting to help, the healthy critical spirit, can be judged favorable, even if the criticism is not always acceptable.

We must regard it as a positive factor that some of the students (perhaps 15-20 percent) are committed to socialism ideologically and consciously; they are active, principled and political in every area.

8984  
CSO: 2500/130

HUNGARY

YOUTH PROBLEMS: RESOLUTIONS SEEN AS KEY TO FUTURE

Budapest MAGYAR IFJUSAG in Hungarian 28 Dec 84 pp 7-9

Interview with Laszlo Thoma, of the Social Sciences Institute, by Sandor Rege: "The Problems of the Youth"

Text Question On the previous occasion we talked about the situation in Western Europe, about the youth of the developed capitalist countries and their situation. Let us turn to the domestic relationships. Many dispute that we also might have a "youth problem." Others, even if they accept the superficial symptoms, say that this is only a "ripple effect," that fashion trends infect the youth. What sort of situation are we in?

Answer First of all we must get rid of the spontaneous defensive reflex which consists of immediately looking for a way to defend ourselves if we experience any contradiction among the youth. We are still always taken aback if the next generation does not want what we want, does not want to live according to the norms as we had imagined them. According to our earlier dogmas the youth could not have a greater crime than this.

In the 1950's we said that we would have no trouble with the new generation because we were educating them. We should get rid of this idea once and for all. This behavior regards someone who talks about problems not as a partner but rather as an enemy. This phenomenon creates the intolerance or impatience which, unfortunately, we can see frequently in connection with youth clubs and youth music and it creates the exaggerated criticism of the youth press too. In the second place we must recognize that every new generation has its unique problems. The third position with which we should break is that youth contradictions come to us as a "ripple effect." We always believed that the young people simply took over the western phenomena. There is truth in this because the subcultural forms (for example, musical forms, clothing fashions) spread independent of the social situation too; indeed, the mass media spread them much more effectively than every before. But this is not the important thing. What is important is what the form hides. A musical trend or taste can carry quite different "signals" in different societies or even in different strata and these can be understood only with analysis. With concrete analysis. The fourth condition for understanding our situation is to put an end to the myth of a uniform youth! We should not identify the behavior of some youth group with the behavior of all youth! This starts manipulation mechanisms,

market or other manipulations, or is the moral blackmail of society, or arouses hysteria against the youth. Unfortunately there are examples of all these things, more than there should be.

Question/ So let us take a look at the Hungarian "youth problem." What phases has the situation of the youth gone through, how has it changed?

Answer/ Let us say something first about the Hungarian youth questions of the 1960's and 1970's. For us also the "youth problem" of the 1960's developed in the course of a large scale, dynamic social and economic transformation. Their questions may have been formulated with much more restraint than the questions of the international countercultural moments, but in the same way they rested on illusions about the unbroken nature of economic development--economic growth equals a rising standard of living. Then the basic problem was that the changes within a single generation were incredibly great. And we could not intervene in this in a truly helpful way. While we did significantly mobilize the major portion of the population, we put them to incredibly great social and cultural tests under unfavorable urban conditions. From agriculture to industry, from village to city, at a low technical level, at a low level of qualification, in an unfavorable urban situation...this causes innumerable human injuries.

Question/ And then came the 1970's. What happened to the children of the "injured" generation? What sort of phenomena indicated the new situation?

Answer/ The basic problem of the generation of the 1970's changed in comparison to the 1960's also. Because of the brakes on mobility which had developed it very frequently required inhumanly great effort for a young person to move from one stratum to another. With the brake on mobility a competition of social situations takes the place of a competition of capabilities--and this is the basic problem of our cultivation of talent.

For this reason the rock protest of the 1970's was linked in its emotions and instincts to the accumulated unfavorable situation. I would like to emphasize, however, that the bands and the publicists "manipulated" the original questions. They exaggerated actually existing contradictions. The experience that he had been left behind in society elicited a sharp protest from a youth--especially if this was coupled with an awareness of diminished value. The stratum contradictions of society are increasing everywhere in the world. So, when talking about the contradictions among various youth groups, we cannot say that this is a fashionable international phenomenon, for there was a social, economic and cultural foundation for this here as well. So the basic conflicts in the 1970's were linked to those who had been left behind in society, which poses significant questions in regard to our economic development, our standard of living policy, our educational policy, our system of cultural institutions, our social policy, the situation and mobility of social strata, etc.

Two things came out clearly in this situation. We have a badly conditioned earlier stratum, and they carried the greatest burdens of the 1960's; in the 1970's the children of these strata again became the center of social contradictions. Thus it was not the children of the "heroes" of the beat generation

but rather the children of those living in a socially disadvantaged situation that again became disadvantaged, and became the chief players in the new scandals.

So in the 1970's we also experienced the breakup of the myth of a youth culture and the appearance in its place of hard social contradictions in subcultural forms, and we also experienced that those institutions which deal with the youth were able to give an answer to the questions with ever greater difficulty. So it was in vain that we wanted to use in the 1970's the method of permissiveness and tolerance which had proven itself in the 1960's; the problems were more serious than that. But the contradictions which developed were objectively greater than they should have been. The reason for this was that being "confused" about the youth every institution, every interest and trend, fished with its own net. So there were many debates about the young people, but few for them. There appeared here, for example, that black sociography which took these contradictions to extremes--mamma is on Rakoczi Square, poppa is in prison, the kids are being cared for by the state--and openly or hiddenly they wanted to model our entire society from these phenomena, which naturally was not true.

Question Let us return to the present. Has the judgment of young people changed? We know that even today there is much misunderstanding. Could we see, if we wanted to, what is wrong with young people?

Answer We arrived at a new situation after 1978. The tests of our economic situation, the new income distribution system, the delay in industrial growth, the stagnation of the standard of living were accompanied by a further increase in social contradictions; with the transformation in the situation of certain strata, strata which had high prestige earlier (for example, the intelligentsia) lost their prestige; with the drawing apart of income relationships, work morality was transformed quickly, the norm system which had developed earlier in performance and in consumption was transformed. This was accompanied by a certain loss of values for the young people.

But now it is not just a single disadvantaged youth stratum but rather a number of youth strata which are getting into a contradictory situation. The secondary school stratum which represents the replacements for the intelligentsia is in a contradictory situation. They must struggle very hard to get into the closed higher educational institutions; at the same time, if they get into a college or university, they may feel the decline in the social prestige and material recognition of the career chosen. The young skilled workers are in a contradictory situation for the value of the first 8 hours has decreased in every respect. So their prosperity is linked not to the socially-organized work but rather to secondary work, to the second or even the third economy. And I could continue the list. We must face very hard problems today, but these are not only youth problems although, of course, they affect the youth every directly and strongly.

For example, employment, manpower management and specialized training taken together are conserving a situation which holds back our economic progress. And this has a significant influence on the outlook of young people. We are dealing most harshly with the factor which is most important for us, the human factor.

The situation leads to wasting human energies and creative spirit. The restrictions affecting the standard of living have evoked a reaction from the populace whereby they have looked for new income sources; this increases the harmful effects of overwork and wastes creative energies in some intellectual careers. In contrast to the officially decreasing work time the real work time is increasing, not that of creative work but that of those seeking money. The young engineer who undertakes overtime, the young physician who will do anything for extra money, the young teacher who rushes for extra income are treating their creative energies incredibly wastefully.

And the tensions and contradictions among the strata remain; indeed, the material and cultural advantages and disadvantages pile up over generations. It is a new phenomenon that the problem of adjustment now affects not only the young people in disadvantaged situation but the majority of the young people. We must defend not only the right to creative work but also the right to start an independent life, the basic condition for which is housing. But let us not analyse this now. So I say that we should again review our entire system of developmental priorities, not only in the interest of the young people but in the interest of the entire society.

Question So the youth problem is a consequence of social disturbances. So we should not pin the causes on the necks of the young people and maybe we should not blame them for the consequences. What are the newest symptoms causing confusion? Where are we going?

Answer New contradictions are piling up on our old problems. We were unable to solve the housing problem earlier, we were unable to satisfy the demand for creative work. The stratum contradictions remain and are being inherited. We have been unable to carry through a real differentiation according to performance, even today incomes do not reflect real performance, but they offer wide scope in secondary distribution for speculation deriving from the shortage economy. This creates value disturbances too. If the social conditions for human life become more difficult then more and more youth strata will get into a difficult situation.

Question And what will happen in the meantime with youth culture? Will the youth continue to appear to be singing and dancing while in reality the youth are "lamenting"?

Answer In the 1980's we must reckon not only with deviant subcultural manifestations. The contradictions connected with the youth will be greater and sharper. The rock movement is dying out, it is slowly losing its mass base, the underground is uninteresting. A unique crisis of self-assertion may develop in the young people in the 1980's; this crisis will come to the surface most strongly in the recognition of work and in the right to creative work. The contradictions appearing here are already producing a certain antipathy to performance, the signs of which can be observed even in our secondary schools. The devaluation of the graduation certificate indicates this. The same thing will probably run its course in career orientation and in the relationship to secondary distribution. That is, we need not reckon again with a growth in active protest froms but rather with these passive value disturbances,

which cannot be countered simply by social policy but rather oblige us to carry out very serious social reforms. We must find a solution to the problem of recognizing the "first 8 hours." To the extent that we put off again and again a solution to the recognition of work in a society of work this will result in people losing their perspective, because we will be forfeiting the prestige of work in a socialist society.

The other big question is starting an independent life. We must ensure this, we must take care of the housing problem. I do not believe that this can be solved without rethinking our developmental priorities. And we are being forced to do so already.

/Question/ Do we know already what we must do? And if we know, will we do it?

/Answer/ At the moment it is not possible to give an answer to what the reaction of young people will be to an increase in our contradictions. As I see it the symptoms of confusion among the youth will be more general than they were in the 1960's; they will not take cultural forms but rather will appear in disturbances in the socioeconomic adjustment of people; and I know that young people will get into a hard situation. If the family, instructional, educational conditions for young people do not improve, then they will enter life hurt. And it appears that if we cannot make progress in this question, then it will be difficult to master the problems of our economy. The first step, at least in the short run, would be infrastructural development and improving the Hungarian training system, and it already appears that what the turn of the century will be like, even though this appears still distant, will depend on this. Only patience and rethinking what we have to do can help.

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Where to go and how. In the final analysis this is the question hidden in the lines of the interview. The material was prepared before the session of the party dealing with youth policy, but with an awareness of it. So it is justified to quote an idea from the position taken: "The entire society must do more for the youth; but the youth also should feel their responsibility for themselves and for society.... So it is our common task to educate the youth for greater independence, firmness and diligence...." The stand of the party contains the answers to the open questions; their implementation is our common task.

8984  
CSO: 2500/149

HUNGARY

FINANCING, IMPROVEMENT OF SOCIAL ENTITLEMENTS STILL UNRESOLVED

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 6 Dec 84 p 3

/Article by Gyorgy Szepesi: "Perspectives of Social Policy" /

/Text/ Social policy is in style. There are scientific conferences on this subject, and researchers and practical experts in the field are discussing timely social policy questions. All this indicates that our social policy is undergoing change, and we are far from arriving at an agreement on the basis of a mature, long-term concept. The positions now being discussed are clear--this, too, is an achievement--but this projectory of the development is not yet very evident. In the following I shall undertake to review these discussions.

The Allowances Are Not the Cause

The Hungarian economic growth rate slowed down at the end of the 1970's. Because of the unfavorable change in foreign economic conditions and the inadequate adaptability of the Hungarian economy, since 1981 we have had no way of maintaining the average level of real wages. Understandably, this limits the strengthening of material incentives aimed at improving achievements. The continuing growth in the ratio of social incomes (allowances) in the structure of the population's income also has an unfavorable effect on the development of real wages. In the past 4 to 5 years this growth has come to about 5 percentage points and its present share is 35 percent. The long-term increase in this ratio is also the cause for the improvement in living standards and the strengthening of life and social security.

With the relatively rapid rate of economic growth, this did not prevent an increase in real wages until the end of the 1970's. Given the slow growth of the economy and declining domestic consumption, however, it is not possible to increase or maintain real wages and to increase the ratio of social incomes. It is very important that we do not confuse cause and effect. The actual cause is not the high ratio of allowances but the necessarily low rate of economic growth. This is important because we are not suggesting that social allowances

are increasing in a perceptible way while the average purchasing power of wages is declining. Unfortunately, last year we did not succeed in guarding the real value of social allowances, and partly as a consequence of this the relative income situation of families with more than one child and those on above average pensions deteriorated.

The essence of the dilemma is that if within the foreseeable future we cannot count on a rapid rate of growth characteristic of the first half of the 1970's, a further relatively rapid increase in the ratio of social allowances, by the nature of the matter, will prevent the realization of our ideas for real wages. But already it is a task for the near future to stop the decline in real wages and to establish a small rate of growth--differentiated on the basis of achievements.

It is similarly an urgent task to improve in a variety of ways the living standards and income situation of families with more than one child, of long-time pensioners and groups in a disadvantageous situation. This can be solved by a reduction of the ratio growth, as mentioned, and subsequently by ending it, only if the priorities, structure and mechanism of social policy are reorganized. Otherwise the reduction in the ratio growth may lead to a sharpening of social tensions and a further decline in the real value of social allowances.

In judging the problem we must consider that as a consequence of demographic causes, the ratio of social incomes in the coming years will grow at a slower rate than formerly because the number of those going on pensions is declining, the number of births is low, and so forth. But an easing in the demographic influences in itself, however, will not be enough to reduce the growth rate of allowances to such an extent as will make it possible to maintain the level or subsequently increase real wages. Therefore, we cannot avoid working out a long-term concept for social policy and a development program.

#### Mutual Understanding Essential

Modernization of social allowances, provisions and subsidies--by the nature of the matter--is possible only over the long term. If it is true anywhere at all, it is an essential condition here that a mutual understanding should be developed between the government and the interest representational organs of society regarding the ratio and mode of the suggested changes.

The most important basic principle is that social policy must be built in the future as well on the system of normative allowances and on virtually full-scope social security. At the same time, certain changes are needed. On the basis of discussions and exchanges of ideas held thus far, these are the following:

--a) removal and gradual elimination of dysfunctions. This includes the termination of the illegal and irregular application of certain

allowances. Another and much more difficult task is the transformation of primarily local (work place) supports which do not extend subsidies, or at least not to those in need of them. Therefore, we are speaking here chiefly of reorganization and not of reduction (a good example is supports for recreation, which--as is well known--does not go to those who need it).

--b) broader implementation of the principle of need. Up to now also, need has belonged to the basic principles of our social policy. It is by virtue of this principle that care is realized for the sick, the elderly and groups of people in various disadvantageous situations. At the same time for various causes, disadvantageous situations may develop in society which cannot be handled, or at least not adequately, in the framework of a central normative allowance and provisions system. Thus a stronger principle of need has to be corrected by introducing new forms of care into existing institutions for social policy. In this framework there will be occasion for building up a national family-care network.

Considering the limited economic resources available, the principle of need can be realized in practice only if the load ratios are also changed. To simplify, this means that those with the greater incomes should contribute in greater ratio to the realization of social goals. In addition to maintaining the basic features of the allowance and provisions system, this may be the main direction for regrouping within social policy. This is in accordance with the principle of social justice, and at the same time requires also the modification of certain mechanisms of social security. A step in this direction was taken in 1983 when the progressive nature of the pension premium paid by workers was increased. But it was exactly this change which focused attention on the problem that the contributions should be made on the basis of one's actual income and wealth situation and not on the basis of earnings deriving from and "official" main occupation and reflecting this situation imperfectly.

#### Proportionate Burdens

Proportionate burdens and allowances according to need can be built into the distribution system together with the introduction of the general personal income tax system planned for 1984-1987. It is already agreed upon that in assessing personal income taxes it is necessary to take into account the actual income and health situations of families. The question of how, in what way, and to what extent is still largely unanswered. The linking of earnings derived from the main occupation into general taxation will make it possible and necessary to reevaluate the principles, mechanisms and the extent of social security. In order to improve the efficiency and justice of social policy it must be studied in what way the principle of need and the related matter of more proportionate burdens can be realized in this very important area.

Up to now two types of solution in this regard have been outlined. One emphasizes the self-financing and insurance nature of social security. In this case the increased social functions of distribution would be met in their entirety from taxation. The other regards it as desirable to realize the principle of need and of proportionate burdens as desirable in social security along with the maintaining of basic principles. In my opinion, the latter solution is more to the purpose. In working out the longer term concept of social policy, we must find answers to this question and many others of this type which require manifold social and economic deliberation.

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CSO: 2500/129

HUNGARY

PRELIMINARY FIGURES FOR 1981-1985 CHANGES IN CPI

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian No 49, 8 Dec 84 pp 34-36

/Article by Mihaly Zafir: "Consumer Price Level: Indexed Prices"

/Text/ Already today--one year before the completion of the Sixth 5-Year Plan--one can estimate with relatively great precision how much the consumer price level rose between 1981 and 1985. A main department chief in the Central Statistics Office--the author of the following article--summarizes the figures thus far.

Public opinion--and of course this is true not only in Hungary--in judging the development of incomes watches perhaps most sensitively the change in prices. While everyone makes his own luck in the development of his income, to a certain extent, prices are presented to all of us as accomplished facts.

The Sixth 5-Year Plan counted on an average increase in consumer prices of 4.5-5 percent per year, thus that in 1985 consumer prices would be higher than in 1980 by an average of 25-28 percent. When establishing this magnitude for price increases the economic policy decision-makers took a number of factors into consideration: in the first place the inflationary effect of the global economic crisis which would be realized here also and which would only be increased by our balance and economic development problems. Also figuring as price increasing factors were the gradual removal of price supports which had been built into the consumer prices decades ago and the "coming home" of the new world market price proportions which developed in the wake of the oil price explosions.

We can already see how the consumer price level actually developed between 1981 and 1985, for we know that the price increase was 4.6 percent in 1981, 6.9 percent in 1982, 7.3 percent in 1983 and an increase of about 8 percent can be expected this year. Since the annual price increases are linked together like a chain the 1984 consumer price level will be about 30 percent higher than it was in 1980. Added to this will be the 1985 price increase, which is expected to be about 7 percent--according to our present information. So as the final result consumer prices increased by an average of 38-40 percent in 5 years.

The causes of the difference between the planned 25-28 percent and the 38-40 percent actually expected are various and disputed. Certainly a role was played by the fact that the world political and world economic situation became more unfavorable than the planners had counted on at the time, that the improvement in economic efficiency was slower than necessary, that balance problems became sharper and that the forint was devalued several times in recent years --to encourage export.

The larger half of the price increases in the past 4 years were several central authoritative price increases. We can regard the following as the most important of them:

In 1981--newspapers and periodicals, 20 percent; gasoline, 31 percent; telephone calls, 50-100 percent; postal services, 90 percent; meat and meat products, 6-13 percent; distilled alcohol and tobacco, 20 percent; housing use fees doubled and the price of housing sold by the councils increased;

In 1982--fuels, 10-48 percent; central heating and hot water, 10-30 percent; gasoline (twice) 15 and 20 percent; beer, 19 percent; coffee, 40 percent; bread and baked goods, 20 percent; tropical fruit, 25 percent; some building materials, 12-30 percent; long distance passenger transport, 100-120 percent;

In 1983--passenger cars, 10 percent; sugar, 23 percent; margarine and cooking oil, 10-20 percent; bread, 16 percent; baked goods, 12 percent; gold articles, 11 percent; ice cream, 15-20 percent; the first and largest increase in rent; milk assignments ended;

In 1984--meat and meat products, 21 percent; beer, 15 percent; heating oil, 20 percent; night current, 50 percent; some building materials 10-30 percent.

All these central measures increased the consumer price level by 2 percent in 1981 and by 4 percent every year since.

The price level increasing effect of enterprise price increases became more intense also. The latter increased the price level as a whole by about 2.5 percent in 1981, by nearly 3 percent in 1982 and by more than 3 percent in 1983. In 1984 they caused a 4 percent price level increase over all. The accelerating pace is caused in part by the fact that in the meantime the sphere of free price articles expanded and the producers passed on in the free prices the multiple increase in energy prices. The forint was devalued twice in 1982; this hardly affected the development of prices in that year but since then it has affected it significantly. It also increased the price index that--as is well known--seasonal agricultural articles were extraordinarily expensive this year.

Table 1. Consumer Price Index According to Social Classes and Strata,  
 August 1984  
 (Same Period of Preceding Year=100)

Worker Class	109.0
Cooperative Peasantry	108.7
Double Income	108.7
Non-physical Employees	108.6
Pensioners	109.7
Total Population	109.0

Table 2. Consumer Price Index According to Chief Expenditure Groups,  
 August 1984  
 (Same Period of Preceding Year=100)

Foodstuffs:	
Non-seasonal Articles	112.8
Seasonal Articles	127.1
Total	115.2
Luxury Articles	105.0
Clothing Articles	111.5
Heating, Household Energy	105.0
Durable Consumer Goods	105.2
Other Industrial Articles	106.9
Services	107.9
Total	109.0

Source: STATISZTIKAI HAVI KOZLEMENYEK, October 1984

The statistics show or study the price index in various social cross sections also and show whether the articles more likely to be consumed by the several social strata change uniformly or differently. According to the calculations such differences caused a deviation of only 1-2 percent over the past 4 years. This small difference can be attributed in part to the fact that there are no outstanding differences in the consumption structure of the various strata and to the fact that the price increases affected almost every product and service--if to differing degrees.

There can be no doubt that price increases cause the greatest economic and social damage if the process is elemental, destructive and not kept within bounds. An inflation of this sort has not taken place in Hungary in recent years--not even if the actual price increase considerably exceeds what was planned for the 5 years--for the prescription pertaining to price increases in the annual plans is one of the "hardest" indexes.

On one side of the coin it can be shown that only by increasing the consumer price level has it been possible to avoid upsetting the domestic supply-demand balance, and the increase in consumer prices contributed to stabilization of the external economic balance in that it held back an increase in import and held back the domestic consumption of some foodstuffs which can be exported. Specific fuel use also decreased.

On the other side of the coin, naturally, one can list a number of negative consequences of the lasting and relatively swift price increases. The already strong levelling trends in wage payment were strengthened, a disposition was aroused in regard to wage payment not backed by performance and the people's willingness to save diminished. In recent years the price index for housing construction increased more than the average and the lot prices increased particularly fast; the public works needed for housing that get more and more expensive increase the expenditures of builders, in many ways they are at the mercy of this, and sliding money is spreading. At the same time it is a fact that in most countries of Western Europe the rate of price increases is decreasing already and in many places it is lower than in Hungary. It is true that in the western countries they are paying for the decreasing inflation with high unemployment.

Domestic economists are in disagreement as to how many of the price increases can be attributed to objective causes and how many to decisions which will prove wrong subsequently but it is a fact that however unpleasant it is to increase prices this cannot be "forbidden" as long as objective factors are involved.

It would be easier to live with price increases, however, if there were "norms" for doing so. In the absence of these, for example, the scales for child care institution fees and scholarships quickly become obsolete and thus the social content of the rebates weakens and sometimes is lost. The forint values for meals for children and in factories and hospital health services do not have a constant value, thus the quality of service necessarily declines.

In regard to the future, of course, the most important question is the relationship of prices and incomes. Looking at the all-social average--at least so it appears today--the global real income and consumption levels prescribed in the Sixth 5-Year Plan can be achieved, because not only were price increases greater than planned but so was the flow of income measured in money.

A swift price increase causes a greater than average problem for those with low incomes, those with many children and for a large proportion of the older pensioners. This is true even if their consumer price index does not deviate significantly from the average, for in the case of those with larger incomes the proportion of savings and freely regroupable income is greater whereas for those with low incomes every forint is accounted for.

## A Glance Into the Basket

The purpose of calculating a price index is to show how much a determined volume of products and services costs at the consumers' prices valid for different times. The ratio between these periods is the consumer price index. For several decades statistics has used the so-called consumer basket to aid this calculation. This is the summary name of those products and services which are considered when calculating the price index.

When this expression first appeared in domestic statistics--in the 1930's virtually everything on the list could actually fit, not just figuratively, into a good sized market basket. Now the consumption of the population is more than three times what it was before the liberation so the goods and services included in the consumer price index calculation constitute such a broad scale and represent such a large bulk as to exceed many times the capacity of a basket and, naturally, it could not contain all the products and services concretely existing and purchased.

The price index is prepared--as everywhere in the world--with a representative method; that is, it watches the price of a certain number of products and services characteristic of the several groups of consumption, taken out of the entire sphere of actual consumption. These designated products and services are the so-called representatives. The representatives always include everything which the great majority of families consume, which have a significant volume in consumption and which cannot be replaced with something else. In Hungary the statistical apparatus watches throughout the country, in a number of shops and markets, the price of more than 2,400 representative products and services, very many compared to international practice. For example, one such representative is "woman's winter coat with padding, 100-115 cm long, without fur collar, of pure carded wool cloth weighing 390-360 gr/m<sup>2</sup>". This representative, with 13 others, represents women's coats.

Those watching the prices belong to the Central Statistics Office, thus to an organization free of enterprise, authority or regional interests. The price recorders systematically record the prices of the representative goods month after month and the individual price indexes come from a comparison of the prices recorded at different times. Making groups out of the individual price indexes they calculate--by averaging--the price indexes for the various product groups, from which, finally, they get the global index.

The reliability of the price index depends on the one hand on the selection of the representatives and on the other hand on the quality of the data on the money expenditures of the population. The Central Statistics Office obtains the data pertaining to money expenditures from about 8,000 families providing data voluntarily and selected

at random to represent the composition of the population from the most important viewpoints. These families record every day what they receive and how much they spend on what. Their expenditures are sorted into 115 groups. The large number of families providing information makes it possible to process the price data in groupings according to social classes and strata and size of income. Thus it can be shown, for example, that the 1982 per capita expenditures of working families of 35,316 forints would be 37,876 forints at 1983 prices, 2,560 forints more than at prices for the preceding year, and thus the price index for the working class was 107.2 percent in 1983.

What price statistics cannot deal with, either here or elsewhere, is an interpretation of the price of qualitatively new products--for example, color televisions, teflon utensils or new synthetics. When they begin to be sold in volume their price index is taken to be 100 percent, since one cannot measure whether their use value--compared to traditional items--is in proportion to their price. But statistics can show price changes in every cause where variety is changed remaining within determined characteristics, thus when the old product is replaced by a new one and the use value of it is the same as that of the new one.

Domestic price index calculations have the fate of price indexes throughout the world in that the consumers cast doubt on their validity. Public opinion usually judges price increases to be greater than shown in the price index, and this follows naturally from three things: from the different consumption structures of households, from the different nature of the proportions of freely disposable income for different households and from the unique aspects of consumption sensitivity.

8984  
CSO: 2500/127

HUNGARY

NEW HUNGARIAN MAGAZINES REFLECT ECONOMIC REFORMS

Copenhagen INFORMATION ONSDAG in Danish 7 Nov 84 p 3

/Article by Kirsten Bruun: "New Generation of Hungarian Magazines Depend on Readers--and Advertising"/

/Text/ With economic reforms in Hungary have come a new set of pop-culture magazines, but no new role for the press in influencing public opinion.

BUDAPEST--"It is pure and unadulterated horror," grins the lady in the kiosk, "and it is in Hungarian," she adds menacingly.

But the discouragement does not work. The Hungarian magazine kiosks are brimming with brightly colored magazines which provide an irresistible attraction for those yearning for the West--who see all of their hopes for variety frustrated.

Science fiction in psychedelically-colored splendor is only one of the many surprising offerings. Women's magazines with recipes that are invitingly illustrated with colored photos of the enticing delicacies, fashion magazines with a girl's legs in daring closeup pictures (in a full-page color advertisement for elegant high-heeled red shoes), Hi-Fi magazines with the latest in electronics, and magazines for relaxing spare-time interests such as horses and dogs, where the back page is taken up by a huge ad for dog food--all of this is part of Hungary's modern media picture.

The new generation of pop monthly magazines is the first generation of published media in socialist Hungary which must be self-sufficient through the help of sales and advertising income, and which, therefore, are relatively expensive. They are economically dependent on their readers--and advertising--and not just on the communist party's political surveillance of the press. By existing to such a great degree according to the laws of the marketplace rather than the politically-determined framework of the five-year plan, these magazines are a product of Hungary's economic reforms.

But with their often sensationalistic style and pop contents, they are not the most important news in the Hungarian press, says a young media researcher with several foreign study tours behind him. That honor he awards instead to the weekly newspaper, HETI VILAGGAZDASAG--or in the vernacular, HVG, which directly translated means World Economic Review. HVG compares in its content with the British ECONOMIST, says the media researcher. Its layout is similar to the British NEW STATESMAN.

From a circulation of 20,000 in 1979, the magazine today has grown to a circulation of more than 100,000. Neither the quality of the paper nor the extent of paper rationing--and the resulting possibility for printing more magazines and increasing the number of pages--is determined by market forces, but rather, pursuant to political decisions in a government office. Among other things, the press continues under political control in this fashion even with the partially altered economic conditions.

The editor-in-chief of HVG is unusually young--in the very beginning of his 30's. His readers also are young--mostly under 40, according to a survey. The majority of the readers are office workers with an education level corresponding to high school or junior college.

A couple of random issues of the paper from October demonstrate its outlook. There are long quotations from the American press, such as INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, NEWSWEEK, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT; Western Europe is represented by, e.g., DER SPIEGEL, WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, LE MONDE, LE FIGARO, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR; from the Third World are quotations from the magazine, SOUTH; in these two issues, the East Bloc countries are represented solely by the Soviet government publication, IZVESTIYA.

Cartoons from the British PUNCH, the German STERN and FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, along with the Austrian NEUE KRONEN ZEITUNG, also have found their way into these issues of HVG.

The paper is distinctive for its thorough feature stories on Hungary, states the media researcher. It has learned the trick of viewing all problems from an economic perspective. This provides for a very factual treatment, which in turn means that the journalists can present matters in a naked fashion without embellishing them with sharp political attacks, he says.

He sees HVG as being the child of the second economic reform wave of 1978. In the 1960's the political and economic institutions were so centralized that the economic reforms in 1968 became a cause for a very narrow political elite. No attempts were made at developing any broad societal support, he clarifies.

But if one compares the economic coverage by the press in the beginning of the 1970's with today, a significant expansion and improvement in quality have occurred.

HVG is the best offering of the new generation which was born and has grown up after the Second World War and which has become professionally active since the 1968 reforms. By means of the qualified coverage--represented first and foremost by HVG--this generation gets support for converting a new economic mentality into practice, the media researcher believes.

#### Improved Polish Coverage

He believes especially that HVG has covered the developments in Poland more carefully and in a more balanced manner than the other Hungarian media.

The picture of the other socialistic countries which can be found in Hungarian newspapers is determined by how much the subject countries' own press write about developments in the respective countries. A corresponding rule applies to the other East Bloc countries. This was agreed to at an international meeting in 1970 among the party secretaries responsible for ideology.

In practice, however, the Eastern press writes even less than the threshold amount which in fact is allowed under this agreement.

A backlash occurred in Hungary from the shock which Hungarian newspaper readers got from Solidarity and the Polish situation in August 1980. In the preceding years they had been given primarily the reports on quantitative progress which the Polish press presented, but were not very familiar with the crisis indicators which the Polish press also reported.

The level of information concerning Poland is higher today than in 1980, but not as high as in 1981 when the Polish censorship rules were loosened, the media researcher says.

#### Western Management

There is also evidence of an expansion of coverage of Western countries. As a general rule, the local communist party's views are supported to the extent they do not deviate from the Moscow line, as in the case with the Italian and Spanish parties.

One also can read in the Hungarian press about countries where the communist parties have a certain size and importance--as for example, France and Italy. But one does not have the chance to even guess the reasons for the fact that the communist party in other countries--for

example, the U.S. and West Germany--are nearly totally without significance, says the media researcher. Nevertheless, he believes that in general, Hungarian newspaper readers get a more realistic picture of everyday and economic life in the West than do Soviet readers.

An economic crisis-stricken West is the normal picture in the Eastern press, but this has been softeneed in conformity with the economic reforms in Hungary, where the party paper, NEPSZABADSAG, also has published articles on modern Western management--as a lesson, not to frighten. In this manner, the Hungarian press attempts to assist in following up the economic reforms and improving their changes of succeeding. But it will be a long time before one will see the reverse--that Hungarian newspapers are able independently to set in motion the economic and political developments in the country, the media researcher predicts.

The economic reforms have created a certain possibility for an autonomous and independent impact in the economic field, he says, but the same does not hold true respecting political reform (cf. the interview with the sociologist, former Hungarian prime minister Andras Hegedus, in INFORMATION for 11 October 1984).

The development of the political system is limited, among other reasons, because the various interest groups do not have any direct access for expressing themselves in the media. Even an association of physically handicapped persons has had difficulties in obtaining permission to publish its own publication, the media researcher states.

#### Waiting for Reform

He takes this as a sign that the political field--and also the press--lag way behind the economic reforms. As an example of how the Hungarian society has matured with the expansion of its political institutions and of how the press can play a positive role as a catalyst, he points out how a television program concerning the threatened demolition of an architecturally important building led to the desire to form a society which now campaigns for preservation of old buildings.

At the same time, the Hungarian media researcher emphasized that there are many dilemmas involved in the further development of the press. He cites as an example the ease with which the press may be criticized for its becoming commercialized. But if one is to support a certain free enterprise economy, one cannot at the same time oppose all types of advertising in the printed and electronic media, he says.

One of his colleagues pursued this idea when, at an international congress for media researchers, he recently asserted that many Hungarians today feel that they can strengthen the progressive trend in the country's economic reforms not only by encouraging a further expansion of the free market economy, but also through the development

of the society's political structures in an attempt to counter economic and commercial considerations being the only forces setting the course for the future.

In this regard, the Hungarian press still awaits keeping pace with the economic reforms; the conspicuous new generation of economically self-sufficient pop monthly magazines have not given the press any role to play in the formation of political opinions, he emphasizes in his speech.

12578

CSO: 3613/42

POLAND

PRIEST VIEWS ATTACK AS 'TERRORIST ROBBERY'

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8-9 Dec 84 p 8

[Article by special correspondent Aleksander Checko: "Assault on Two Parish Priests"]

[Text] The militiamen conducting the investigation told me about the details of two assaults on Lublin priests, but every now and then he asked me not to report certain details of the incidents. Why? The incidents have gained publicity, if only because of the information provided by the government spokesman in response to questions from Western correspondents.

[Yes, the incidents have become famous, but we haven't uncovered the offenders yet. And what we say might influence the effectiveness of the investigation.]

Foul tricks. No other words could be used to describe what has been done to Fr Zenon Ziomek of Matczyn and Fr Eugeniusz Kosciolko of Kazimierzowka.

It was 1 a.m. on 25 September when Fr Ziomek, who lives together with his father, heard a noise. He got out of bed and opened the door. Two men jumped at the priest and his father. One of them hit the priest on the head with a knife or a dagger. They bound the priest's arms and legs together behind his back, overpowered his father and started to search the apartment for money and valuables. They found neither. They started to torture the priest: they wounded him in the head and body with a knife and burnt his fingers with a candle, demanding that he give them money. In the end, the priest showed them a cache, from which the men took 30,000 zloty and about 225 dollars. They also took his car keys. Having plundered the rectory, the men drove away in the priest's car, leaving behind the two bound victims.

The second assault this year on a priest from Lublin voivodship took place two months later on 20 November. The victim was Fr Eugeniusz Kosciolko. At about 2 o'clock at night his housekeeper heard a noise in the office. When she opened the door to the office, two criminals in black woolen masks were already inside. They pushed her into the room where the priest was asleep, bound her to a chair and carried her to the next room. They also tied up the priest face down and demanded money. Before he showed them a place where he kept 15,000 zloty and a ritual chain and before they tore another chain off

his neck, they beat him with their hands, pointed a bayonet at his throat, pierced his ears with it and burnt his abdomen with a candle. They left the priest and his housekeeper bound and drove off.

The investigation in the first case started over two months ago and in the second over 10 days ago. Both are supervised by the Lublin Voivodship Prosecutor.

The people injured in both cases of assault and battery (for that is how both crimes have been qualified--Article 210, Section 2, of the Penal Code) cannot describe the assailants in detail. They were masked and spoke in a half-whisper. The only thing we know for certain is that they were young people, about 18-20 years of age according to the victims.

Having been notified about the crimes, the militia first performed routine activities. Site inspections were conducted, residents of both villages were questioned, etc. Several explanations of the incidents were tested and rejected. So far the officer conducting the investigation has rejected nine probable versions of the events and has tested the alibis of several people and cleared them of suspicion. Sixteen special features characteristic of both the Matczyn and the Kazimierzowska assaults indicate that the same criminals may have been involved in both cases. Both rectories are situated on the roadside, both assaults took place in the middle of the night (Monday night), the criminals were masked, used a dagger, demanded only money and valuables, etc.

Until recently, the assaults on the two Lublin priests were loudly discussed in their parishes and abroad. Colonel Aleksander Hochowski, deputy chief of the Lublin Voivodship Internal Affairs Office, says that before the assaults nothing had happened in either parish to stir up the interest of security police, let alone to provoke it to intervene in any way.

Fr Zenon Ziomka refused to talk to me, but Fr Eugeniusz Kosciolko agreed. He said it was his duty to speak out, because the whole affair was surrounded by too many ambiguities. In describing the event a week ago, local papers misrepresented several principal facts. Kazimierzowska residents interpreted this misrepresentation as purposeful. Foreign journalists visited or called the priest to ask for confirmation of the facts.

"It is true that I had supplied them with the information that was later published by Western newspapers," Fr Kosciolko admitted. "It is true that I've been horrified by what happened. I still ask who will become the next victim?"

"But now I already know that the terror of which I spoke and am speaking is understood in different ways. For me it was a bestial, terrorist robbery and assault. They didn't come to kill me but for money and valuables. They looked for them, found nothing, and then began to beat me. I told them: 'Why are you beating me? Kill me, but don't torture me!' They began to search again, I was sure I was going to die. They knew I was helpless.

"I spoke about terror also in the sense that people are shocked that someone raised his hand against a priest and that local priests are scared. Maybe I sounded cynical when I answered another priest who asked me how I can speak so freely about the crime against myself: 'because I've already gone through it....'

"As a priest I didn't engage in political affairs. My mission involves the construction of the Temple of Peace at Majdanek [former Nazi concentration camp--editor's note]. I am in no conflict with anyone in my parish. That is why I do not think that what happened to me had a political background.

"It is true that I am afraid. Three parishioners sleep in my house every night. I realize that everyone interprets the facts the way he wants to see them. In the hospital where I reported for examination, I even heard that '[t]hose must have been the same hands that murdered Popieluszko....' My heart sank at those words. I do not know yet who the assailants were. The investigation is continuing. But I am convinced it was an act of criminal terror, void of any political aspects. Violence was used against me at my home," Fr Kosciolko concluded.

CSO: 2600/468

POLAND

LEADERS SEND MESSAGE TO PRK ON CHAN SI'S DEATH

BK080804 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1100 GMT 4 Jan 85

[ "Text" of recent condolence message from Poland's Wojciech Jaruzelski and Henryk Jablonski to Heng Samrin]

[Text] The Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee, the Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic [PPR], and the entire Polish people have learned with sorrow of the death of Comrade Chan Si, Political Bureau member of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRK, a well known revolutionary, an important member of the party, a statesman, an important patriot, and a militant for the victory of the consolidation of the people's power in Cambodia. Comrade Chan Si was a spokesman for unity and cooperation among socialist countries and for the struggle for peace in Southeast Asia. He made great contributions to the development of the relations between the PPR and the PRK and the consolidation of the fraternal friendship between our two parties and peoples, particularly during his visit to Poland in August 1984.

On behalf of the highest-ranking leadership of the party, state, and nation of the PPR and in our own names, we extend to you and to the KPRP Central Committee, Government of the PRK, Cambodian nation, and the bereaved family, our deepest condolences.

CSO: 2600/469

POLAND

KURON COMMENTS ON PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Dec 84 p 6

[Article by Jacek Kuron]

[Text] Jacek Kuron was the force behind the self-disbanded Social Defense Committee (KOR), for which he was put on trial for attacking the foundations of the Polish State. Kuron was released as a result of last 22 July's amnesty. In this article, which appeared recently in the underground Warsaw press, Kuron analyzes the murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko, the trial of whose slayers begins today in Torun, and reaches the conclusion that Poland's number one leader, Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski, is not implicated in the crime. At the same time, Kuron recommends increasing the pressure on the regime to force an understanding between the government and society in Poland.

We have three perpetrators of the crime, persons from the same section, the same department of the Interior Ministry, reportedly Department Number 4, which, as was acknowledged, handled church affairs. Grzegorz Piotrowski, one of the three, is the head of this department. What this office does is still a mystery.

Are the perpetrators of the crime degenerate murderers? It is known that Father Popieluszko was tortured. This came to light because according to the government's spokesman, "the club with which they beat him is now under analysis." So then, we have three degenerate murderers who by some strange coincidence were together in a single department of the Interior Ministry. We might ask how this can be.

If the murder were for personal reasons or insanity-related, then the three must have manifested suicidal tendencies at the same time.

When Father Popieluszko went to Bydgoszcz, the Bydgoszcz Provincial Office of the Interior Ministry (provincial police station) was responsible

for monitoring his movements. It could not have been otherwise, inasmuch as they are responsible for their own jurisdiction. If something so astonishing had happened that Warsaw would have canceled the surveillance order, someone above those three men would have made the decision; not even the director of their department could have done it. Moreover, even if such an order had been issued, then Bydgoszcz "security" would not have had to follow Father Popieluszko; in any event, though, it would have had to monitor everything that he did in its zone.

#### Cover-Up

The Bydgoszcz Provincial Office of the Interior Ministry is accountable to its headquarters for everything that happens in that city. Furthermore, if Warsaw had demobilized Bydgoszcz security on the night of Father Popieluszko's murder, that would mean that it had signed the kidnapping order. In any event, Bydgoszcz must have been involved and in a big way, both if they were following Popieluszko because in that case they would have assigned a great many agents to him, and if they were not since in that event they would all have been unexpectedly demobilized.

There was a published news story that as the three were on their way to kidnap or murder Father Popieluszko, they stopped by the Bydgoszcz Provincial Office of the Interior Ministry to pick up the cards needed to buy gasoline. The press spokesman said that they wanted to direct suspicion towards the Interior Ministry, asserting at the same time, however, that they were trying to cover up their involvement in the incident. By directing suspicion towards the Interior Ministry, they admitted to being the perpetrators of the crime because they themselves had been at the Bydgoszcz Provincial Office of the Interior Ministry. In light of these facts, the process culminating with their arrest 4 or 5 days later could be regarded as very slow indeed. They have admitted to the crime. That much is clear. The only question remains: Why weren't they arrested before?

Assuming that they acted on their own, we would then also assume that not only are they degenerate murderers but suicidal maniacs as well. How did this fail to come out during their long years of service in the department? These individuals held high-level posts. This defies belief. If they are not maniacal murderers, then there is only one conclusion: they were doing their jobs.

If we conclude that the three murderers were doing their job, then suddenly everything becomes clear. First of all, the entire previous string of kidnappings, assaults and tortures is cleared up. Second, the extraordinary coincidence that so many degenerate murderers were together in a single department is also explained. Third, this justifies their conviction that they were acting with impunity, inasmuch as they acted openly, availing themselves of the Interior Ministry's official channels.

## Moral Responsibility

Does this mean that Father Popieluszko was kidnapped in accordance with the wishes of the supreme center of command? It might, because the three murderers worked in an important ministry, perhaps the most important in the government, a government headed by General Jaruzelski. To test this contention we must ask ourselves: Why would the authorities do this? Was it a question of getting Father Popieluszko out of the way? Aside from whether he had to die or just be mercilessly beaten, the incident was clearly going to shock public opinion, and party and government authorities would be held responsible.

Whether they ordered it or not, they bear the entire responsibility. We are talking here about the moral responsibility, because the authorities directed or, in any event, tolerated the overdone hate campaign against Father Popieluszko, and about the legal responsibility, inasmuch as they are responsible for the underlying system of law and order in the country. Moreover, if we assume that General Jaruzelski himself was behind the crime, he could not have spoken out and charged the men who committed it, because the consequences of the crime would have then been much more serious for him than they are now. Finally, if Jaruzelski had been behind it, it would mean that he wanted to compromise himself and, at the same time, create the legend of Father Jerzy. Such a legend would be and in fact is much more dangerous than the priest's activities, which were undoubtedly magnificent and very important, but the man could never have exerted greater influence than his legend. The general would thus have gained nothing.

There is another possibility: the center of command wanted to pin the blame on Solidarity to unleash a wave of terror. No one anywhere, neither in Poland nor abroad, would have believed that Solidarity did it. It would have been better to resort directly to terror, without the need for this provocation.

Lastly, as some people see it, what we have here is a provocation at several levels. Jaruzelski did it so that he could then blame his adversaries, a group inside government, so that he could combat them more effectively later. In this case we would have to assume, first of all, that his adversaries are completely defenseless. If Jaruzelski had engaged in such a provocation while they were unable to defend themselves against it even though they knew that he was the real culprit, then this would have highlighted their own weakness, and would all this have been necessary to do away with them?

Second, whether Jaruzelski or his adversaries were behind everything or not, the crime shatters the prestige of the authorities, inasmuch as they are morally and legally responsible for it.

Third, we all know quite well that they are all one big family; they are colleagues, friends and acquaintances. If Jaruzelski had wanted to involve his people in this terrible crime, no matter what his objective,

people whom, like it or not, he has to appoint as his secretaries, directors or ministers, then this would mean that he is a totally irresponsible man. One thing is clear: He is not a fool. Various criticisms can be leveled at him, but he has demonstrated a certain degree of effective leadership under difficult conditions. And if he is not a fool, then we have to assume that he is a dangerous madman. Such an assumption would make it unnecessary for us to continue using our powers of reasoning.

Everything, then, would be taking place in a situation whose consequences we are unable to forecast, inasmuch as a madman could abdicate tomorrow or even unite Poland with Australia. Such suppositions are unacceptable in a political analysis.

There are no indications that Jaruzelski himself was behind this. If it was not him, then who could it have been?

#### The Breakdown of Government

The police apparatus. On its own or following orders? Inasmuch as the three perpetrators of the crime were doing their duty, as we mentioned, then behind them must have been the entire Security Service apparatus or, rather, that section which, in official parlance, deals with the Church. If it had taken place in another situation, if it were another matter, then other officials would have done the same in accordance with their duties in the service. If this is the case, then there are only two possibilities. One, the breakdown of government has gotten to the point that the police apparatus, which is subordinate to no one, not only operates with impunity but is also so sure of its power that it acted without any orders "from above." Obviously, at least a deputy minister would have had to give the order. This possibility cannot, of course, be ruled out. But had it happened that way, it would imply that there is practically no government in the country anymore. Another hypothesis: the police apparatus did it, headed by a deputy minister but following the orders of some political center. This would mean that we have two groups, one of which is loyal to Jaruzelski while the other pursues its own policy. The second option seems more likely, but at bottom does not differ much from the first. It also lays bare the breakdown of government and an advanced stage of anarchy.

#### Jaruzelski Versus the Police

Why would the police or a political group that opposes Jaruzelski do it? I don't think that the purpose was to get rid of Jaruzelski. Under the conditions in the wake of 13 December 1981, the authorities cannot allow themselves that luxury. The goal was to force Jaruzelski to pursue a given policy, an extremely repressive policy. The police needs a repressive policy because this enhances its importance. We have now explained the first possibility, in other words, the police apparatus itself did it. There was a breakdown of authority, and the apparatus acted on its own. It was madness, but madness on the part of a government body.

The other possibility, in my judgment, is more likely. Behind all this was a political group, to which the police apparatus is subordinate, that is seeking to influence Jaruzelski directly, to dictate his cadre policy, his running of government, the apportioning of privileges and power, and everything else that they have always been fighting for. This is the most convincing explanation, in my judgment, and I feel that no other can be accepted. What were General Jaruzelski's options when it was revealed that Father Popieluszko had been kidnapped? He could have blamed Solidarity or Father Popieluszko; in other words, he could have tried to cover up for the murderers and their patrons. But he would have become a puppet in their hands. I would like to emphasize that at one point he began to do so. Urban, the government's spokesman, reported that a woman had seen Father Popieluszko in the Saska Kepa district and implied unmistakably that the kidnappers were to be found among the ranks of Solidarity. The priest himself was said to be involved, in a bid to turn himself into a legend. The following day, the spokesman did an about-face and pointed quite clearly to the Interior Ministry. That was the day that Grzegorz Piotrowski was arrested. General Jaruzelski refused to be anyone's puppet, which is suicide for a politician, and had to speak out against his own ranks and begin doing what he is doing now. Only a mortal danger can explain his acts, which are a sort of political suicide as well. Not only is he compromising his own apparatus before society but he is also directly attacking the police, which is the underpinning of his power.

And all of this is going on amid a conflict with Polish society. Jaruzelski's adversaries did not think that he would be able to do what he did. No matter what happens, what he has said so far is enough and cannot be erased from society's memory. Nor can he backtrack on what he did by confronting his adversaries, both the police and those behind the police. Jaruzelski is in a very ticklish situation now. He has two options: either back down and try to reach an understanding with his foes in the government apparatus, which is practically impossible because it is too late, or else come to an understanding with society, which will be very difficult, if not impossible for the man who staged the 13 December coup.

The main elites in Polish society are of two minds concerning this latter option. One argument goes as follows: Since Jaruzelski is trying to fix things, we should not hamper him. The more problems he has with society, the less likely he will be to finish what he has started. The other approach is: Because Jaruzelski now has to rely on society more than he ever has since 13 December (and it would seem that he is thus backing down a bit), then we have to pressure him for maximum concessions.

#### Social Mobilization

General Jaruzelski has thus begun to do battle with his apparatus. He must have social peace to finish this battle and strengthen his hand.

If we give him this peace without demanding anything in return, he will obviously not give us anything. This is why we have to pressure the authorities, but in a way that will make terror unnecessary. Everything that has taken place so far has been a form of pressure: the huge turnouts at masses, the nighttime vigils, the mass mobilization of society and the burial itself, at which hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated their solidarity with Father Jerzy and with Solidarity.

The solemn atmosphere of reflection and prayer also clearly bespoke the will of the people. It became clear to everyone that there was a correlation between the death of Father Jerzy and the illegitimacy of the situation in Poland, between legitimacy and society's influence on the exercise of power. The civic committees against violence and the social monitoring of the authorities are important and necessary means of applying pressure at this moment.

8743  
CSO: 3548/72

POLAND

ATTITUDES, RESPONSIBILITIES OF CPSU MEMBERS EXPLAINED

AU101150 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8 Jan 85 p 6

[Jerzy Kraszewski Moscow dispatch: "Discussions Within the CPSU--Daily Verification"]

[Excerpts] Almost every day we learn about the facts showing that the basic echelons of the CPSU are becoming increasingly active and that a climate of commitment and exacting requirements is consolidating within the party.

Let us bear in mind that these phenomena are nothing new and have been in existence for decades, that the party has never been passive, and that it has always responded to the problems produced by social development. This is being proved by daily practice and by the theoretical discussions within the CPSU.

The thesis that the party's leading role has increased and that the process of improving developed socialism is making progress is being verified every day on macro and micro scale--by the activities of the Central Committee, by the initiatives of party organizations, by the strategic concepts adopted by the Central Committee and by the implementation of current tasks.

The high pulse of internal party life was also a feature of the accountability and election campaign that was completed in the primary party organizations last December. Although the elections in these party echelons were held only a year before, the present analyses embrace the entire period since the 26th CPSU Congress which took place in the spring of 1981. This was an opportunity to initially evaluate the implementation of the resolutions passed by the congress and by the important post-congress party plenums, including the plenum in June 1983 devoted to ideological work.

Judging by the commentaries published by the party press, this has made it possible to draw more precise conclusions from the experience of the past few years, to lay bare shortcomings and neglected opportunities, and to formulate the best possible plans for the time immediately before the 27th party congress.

It is therefore possible to assert that the fact that the party has now entered the period of practical preparations for the coming congress is an important condition for the present militancy of CPSU work.

There is no doubt that the most important issue of the multitude of the issues discussed by the Soviet comrades has been the attitudes and responsibilities of party members. The complicated tasks that the CPSU is now tackling, the bold plans for the future, and ambitious economic plans make it necessary for the increased leading role of the party to demonstrate itself through the increased personal responsibility and exemplary committed attitude on the part of every communist.

In this connection it has been stressed that it is necessary to apply exacting ideological and moral criteria, to raise the requirements placed on the communists, and to boost their professional and vocational efficiency, party discipline, political militancy, and responsibility for themselves as well as for the team they work with. The cases in which the valid norms and principles are violated are dealt with calmly and without hysteria, but with the necessary severity, resolution, and consistency. Life is life and people are people. Since they have their weaknesses, the thing is to make them get rid of them and to draw the necessary conclusions in good time.

"The work style of the party organizations and their leading bodies should ensure that the norms of party life are strictly observed and that criticism, self-criticism, and responsibilities of CPSU members and candidates continue to develop," PRAVDA has again stated in an editorial. "Practice is proving that the process of party upbringing is permanent and continuous."

The present discussion has stressed that the development of the communists' attitudes, responsibilities, and discipline must no' be achieved merely by ensuring that various requirements are satisfied. The development of the world outlook, character, and commitment is based on ideological premises--on the knowledge of Marxist-Leninist science, on the comprehension of the nature of our aims, on the adoption of these aims as one's own, and on the total identification with party ideology.

There is no doubt that the invigoration of the theoretical thought in the CPSU is the most profound source and basic condition of the invigoration of the CPSU's internal life. For some time now the CPSU Central Committee has continued to draw up a new party program. This work was begun after the 26th party congress and, on the initiative of the CPSU general secretary, has recently been extended to include possible modifications to the CPSU [word indistinct].

"Every congress plays an enormous role in the life of the party and people," K. Chernenko said at the plenum of the Administration of the USSR Writers' Union. "However, it is no longer doubtful that the importance of the coming congress will be determined by the fact that it adopts a new CPSU program, with the help of which we will continue to work during the coming decades....

Reality should be our starting point, and we should take into consideration whatever is really new and what has appeared in the social practice and theory of the past 25 years or so." (The present program--the third in the history of the CPSU--was adopted by the 22d congress in October 1961.)

The features that are now predominant in the work of the CPSU show that on the basis of these criteria the verification of the experience to date takes place every day. This verification is based on the Marxist-Leninist analysis of social development, and its indirect result has been an increase in the party's leading role in the process of improving developed socialism.

CSO: 2600/470

POLAND

KOHL'S, VOGEL'S OSTPOLITIK COMPARED

Postponement of Trip by Genscher

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 48, 1 Dec 84 p 12

[Article by Henryk Zdanowski: "Polish-West German Relations: Who Is To Foot This Bill?"]

[Text] So, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West Germany's foreign minister and leader of the liberal party, FDP, postponed his ministerial, official state trip to Poland. Of course, we are anything but happy because we wanted this visit to take place. We had even established the date, duration and route with the West German side; the topics for talks were self-evident.

The REUTERS correspondent got it all wrong when he wrote, "But clouds began to gather over this visit with the appearance of Polish accusations, rejected by Bonn, that the West German Government supports attempts to regain German territories lost to Poland after World War II" [retranslated]. On the contrary-- those "accusations" were probably one more impulse for this visit, because Poland and West Germany have to sort out this matter between themselves. Genscher repeatedly, and positively, spoke out in this matter, but each time his new coalition partners contravened him.

Nevertheless, the postponement of the trip (I will say nothing about West Germany's declared reasons or Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement because they were widely covered by the press) seems to be a defeat for Genscher, both as a government minister and deputy chancellor and as FDP leader.

Several days before their leader's scheduled trip, the Free Democrats, in their so-called Mainz statement on German-Polish relations, called for a continuation of Bonn's policy of detente with the East. The Federal Republic of Germany takes as its point of departure "the existing situation in Europe," considers "the borders of all states inviolable now and in the future," and makes "no territorial claims on anyone." Further, it states that signing the 1970 Warsaw accord was a significant contribution to breaking the "cursed circle" of lawlessness against lawlessness in the vicissitudes of Polish-German relations. The FDP claims in its statement that the coalition government with the CDU/CSU Christian Democrats also guarantees the continuity of detente, which the previous coalition with the Social Democrats (SDP) pursued consistently. The "Mainz Statement" was submitted to the FDP federal commission (the supreme authority of this party between its congresses).

This statement underscored the liberals' continuing commitment to Ostpolitik and was apparently a mandate for Genscher before his upcoming trip from a party which has been in coalition governments for 15 years now.

The Christian Democrats, however, also have a tradition of continuity in their attitude toward Ostpolitik, a tradition of refusal.

They did not vote in the Bundestag for the 1970 Warsaw accord, and, when pressed, tried to weaken it with the renowned resolution accompanying the ratification act in which they insisted on the continuing existence of the Reich in its 1937 borders and on the temporary character of the Federal Government's border obligations.

In fighting for power, the Christian Democrats did make the smallest possible gesture, declaring *pacta sunt servanda* [agreements must be respected], and then only as a formal legal necessity.

But no sooner did Kohl's and Strauss' parties come to power than they shifted their position, arguing that it is the resolution which is binding. The Christian Democratic ministers of the new government, as did CDU/CSU deputies and officials, spoke in this spirit.

Viewed against the background, the Genscher trip to Poland becomes one element in the internal tug-of-war between the Christian Democrats and liberals. This is apparent in the character of the directives and blessings with which the CDU/CSU wanted to equip Genscher for his journey to Poland. For example, according to a DPA news agency report, Volker Ruhe, who is deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic caucus in the West German parliament, urged the foreign minister to take "an implacable attitude and to contact the Polish opposition."

Hans-Jochen Vogel, the chairman of the Social Democratic parliamentary caucus, replied to a television reporter's question about the postponement, "In my view, it was significant that immediately before the trip, the visit came under continual fire from the Christian Democrats. I suspect this may have been the real cause of the refusal."

A *LE MONDE* commentator wrote, "This incident shows that Ostpolitik remains a problem in West Germany's internal policy."

Of course, there was Franz-Josef Strauss, who would not be himself if he missed an opportunity to dig at the FDP and the hated Genscher. "It is better not to announce an official visit at all than to delay it at the last minute," said Strauss.

Ultimately, then, Genscher's planned Polish trip, and West Germany's relations with Poland, is the familiar tug-of-war, and the foreign minister let go of the rope. He was sure he could afford this supposedly justified maneuver because Poland is still weak. DPA Bonn commentator Hans-Jurgen Hoefer wrote openly, "Diplomatic circles believe the foreign-policy damage is limited. Conditions which were to support Bonn's endeavors toward dialogue with East-bloc capitals concerned Warsaw only to a small extent," only insofar as it might influence other socialist capitals, according to Hoefer.

So, this was supposedly a risk-free manipulation. Strangely, some people believe Bonn's reasons for postponing the trip are genuine, that Bonn's contacts with dissidents are the most important--through Genscher no less--that for people like Kohl, Strauss, Zimmermann or Ruhe paying homage to the victim of an abominable murder is more important than the task of normalizing mutual relations, which are burdened by so many hideous, enormous Nazi crimes.

The manipulations and attempts to use Polish matters as cards in political games are quite varied. Recently in RZECZPOSPOLITA [Government daily], Ryszard Wojna argued that there was a current in the West actively and deliberately attempting to exclude Poland from the constructive processes between the two blocs to foster ferment or at least some instability in Poland. "In this way, Poland would continue to be a lever that could be pulled at any time to stall or limit the detente process," wrote Wojna.

I can well see another way of exploiting Poland as a tool for other purposes. By his negative attitude and policy toward Poland, President Reagan is preparing himself an ideological alibi to give to his own electoral base--the ultra-conservative segment of America--if a disarmament dialogue develops. This, by the way, would be a new way to treat Polish affairs; only a brief time ago, he used these affairs in his election campaign. In this respect, Bonn, like Paris, has stuck its previous positions; [as printed] they want to conduct their own domestic policy quarrels, especially party tussels, at Poland's expense.

But, from the vantage point of European interests, these manipulations have no future. Europe as a whole simply needs Poland, a well defined Poland as a stabilizing factor. As Hans-Jochen Vogel said at his press conference in Warsaw, "Europe cannot resign from an internally stable Poland."

#### Vogel Supports Continuity in Relations

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 48, 1 Dec 84 p 13

[Interview by Adam Krzeminski: "An Irreversible Process; Interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Caucus in the West German Parliament"]

[Excerpts] Question: Mr Chairman, you said your visit to Warsaw is a token of the continuity in relations between West Germany and Poland. But the situation now is different than it was, say, 10 years ago. You are not visiting this country as government minister or even West German Chancellor but as leader of the opposition Social Democrats. You are visiting a country which is trying hard to regain both internal stability and international significance. Just what, then, is continuity in this case, and what a new beginning? Of the spirit and hopes of the 1970's what has been rescued and transferred into the 1980's?

Answer: I think a lot of what we built together in the 1970's has been preserved. I am sure nobody can question the reconciliation between our nations whose mutual relations after 1939 were so terribly hurt due to what at that time was done in Germany's name, which later backlashed upon us. Something took place between our two nations which existed in our relations with France for a long time and which

now--14 years after the December 1970 Warsaw Accord--I would like also to be able to say about relations between Poles and Germans, that all the failures and remaining difficult matters notwithstanding the fabric of what we began in the 1970's has not been damaged. The process set off by the Warsaw Accord is irreversible.

Question: True, this might be a flicker of hope for the future. Yet what we are really facing is a new beginning because the recent wounds were so deep that many things must be reconsidered.

Answer: On both sides of course changes have taken place that cannot be ignored. These include, first, the process in your country since 1980, which has not ended yet and which has been exposed to a new difficult test following the murder of Fr. Popieluszko. But efforts for a new social agreement have made visible progress in your country, especially the [July 1984] amnesty. Second, on our side a change of government has taken place. The new government is somewhat unsteady in its political line, because of one wing of the Christian Democrats. But even as opposition leader I do not really believe this government wants to break the continuity of the policy we began.

Question: From our vantage point, this is not quite so, but perhaps we will return to this in a moment.

Answer: Third, it should be realized that the December 1970 Warsaw Accord was signed when both superpowers were heading toward detente based on formal treaties and agreements; now they fare each other tensely even lack a common language and mistrust one another.

These three factors convince me that a certain stagnation was inevitable, but now it is again time to make progress, primarily in areas of convergent national interests, such as the economy. During this trip I have also argued that each of our two countries should launch initiatives counteracting the arms race and the wasting of more and more resources on armaments in its respective alliance.

Question: This is where smaller nations have their chance?

Answer: Yes, by all means, and to an extent which formerly I did not realize. Remember, during my visit we agreed to create a working group between the PZPR caucus and our parliamentary faction which is to meet regularly to consider jointly what can be done within the two alliances to ensure real confidence-building measures in Europe. This agreement is another result of the German-Polish accord, which was certainly unthinkable in 1970.

Question: One final question. What are your feelings as you leave Warsaw?

Answer: I leave with the impression that the people who are responsible for this country are trying to save the Polish people from another catastrophe and to provide it with as much freedom of movement, responsibility and coresponsibility as conditions permit. The murder of Fr. Popieluszko shocked the people in your country and is a new, difficult test which until now has been passed but which still contain some foreseeable elements. I wish most sincerely that your people would draw the appropriate conclusions from their historical experience, of which they have had more than any other European nation.

POLAND

CAPTURE OF 'OLD STALINIST' STIMULATES POLITICAL DEBATE

Mijal's Political Career

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 48, 28 Nov 84 p 4

[Article by R-W: "We Present Kazimierz Mijal"]

[Text] Kazimierz Mijal was born in 1910 in the village of Wilkow, Warsaw Voivodship. Before the war he was a bank clerk and a trade union activist--a member of the Warsaw Branch and of the Board of the Union of Bank and Savings Employees, and a member of the Supervisory Board of the Federation of White Collar Unions.

During the Nazi occupation, Mijal was initially a member of the communist group Proletariusz, which was a clandestine organization of communists and radical peasant activists founded in Warsaw in July 1941 (the group also included T. Duracz, A. Fiderkiewicz, W. Kowalski, J. Rydygier and S. Ziaja). In January 1942 he and the rest of the group joined the freshly founded Polish Workers Party [PPR]. He worked in the agricultural department and co-edited TRYBUNA CHLOPSKA. In his clandestine activity he used the noms de guerre Artur, Kaminski and Wrzos. He was one of the organizers of the attack on the Municipal Savings Bank carried out by the People's Guard [GL] on 30 November 1942. As an employee of this bank, Mijal prepared the plan of the action, which brought the PPR 1,052,433 zloty. The whole action lasted 23 minutes, no shots were fired and no one was killed. Mijal was the only one of the bank employees who had to pretend resistance during the attack. He was bruised by Boleslaw Kowalski, alias Zygmunt, which freed him from suspicion of conspiracy. He was gradually promoted in the party. After the leadership of the Cracow PPR branch had been broken up, he became secretary of that branch. Later on, he was secretary of the Warsaw Committee. He participated in the founding meeting of the National People's Council [KRN] on the eve of the New Year 1944. He was elected to the Presidium as secretary and treasurer.

After the liberation, he was the government's plenipotentiary in the city and voivodship of Lodz--he organized new administrative authorities there. He was president of the city of Lodz and chairman of the Town People's Council. In 1947 he was appointed head of the Civilian Chancellery of President Boleslaw Bierut and of the Council of State Chancellery. After the structure of local authorities had been reformed and the Municipal Affairs Ministry had been established in 1950, he was appointed minister of municipal affairs. In the years 1952-1956 he was the presiding minister of the Office of the Council of Ministers. In the years 1956-1957 he was again minister of municipal affairs.

From 1945, Mijal was the alternate member of the PPR Central Committee. During the merger Congress and the 2d PZPR Congress he was elected Central Committee member. He was deputy of the National People's Council, the Legislative Sejm (1947-1952) and the 1st Sejm (1952-1956).

He had two brochures published in Poland: "The Process of Shaping People's Democracy in Poland (Historical Background)"--a transcript of lectures he delivered at the PZPR Central Committee in 1950, published in Warsaw in 1950-- and "Problems of Municipal Economy," published in Warsaw in 1950.

In his political views, Mijal was drawn to extremes. As one of his opponents said, "Mijal was so zealous he always spoke better than the Politburo." At the 3d Central Committee Plenum in 1949, which was devoted to "the party's tasks in the struggle for revolutionary vigilance in the light of the present situation," but in fact was aimed against Gomulka, Mijal attacked Gomulka the most fiercely of all. He insinuated that Gomulka, alias Wieslaw, had been responsible for the arrest of Pawel Finder and Malgorzata Fornalska by the gestapo. Years later, Gomulka reminisced: "Nothing hurt me more than that biting suspicion. I wanted to react immediately and said to Comrade Bierut: 'I can't stand it.' During the recess, Comrade Bierut called Comrade Mijal and told him: 'Go and take your words back.'" And Mijal took the speech back.

In the years 1956-1957, Mijal was one of the most active supporters of the so-called Natolin orientation. He was the most involved of all in personal struggles and spoke the most sonorously for the squaring of old accounts and against democratization, which allegedly endangered the dictatorship of the proletariat. He opposed the re-interpretation of the causes and significance of the June 1956 events in Poznan during the 7th PZPR Central Committee Plenum in July 1956. "Despite the economic reasons and the different problems which we could and should have resolved, the Poznan events may only be described as a counter-revolutionary action against the socialist authorities," he said. According to him, "the Black Thursday" was not a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the living standards and the methods of government, but an action prepared by the armed underground and its imperialistic sponsors. He criticized Minc and Zambrowski's agricultural policy for ignoring the social situation--the peasants' resistance of collectivization. Some months later, he also criticized Gomulka's agricultural policy for yielding to capitalist trends in the country-side and permitting the dissolution of farm cooperatives.

At the 7th Central Committee Plenum in October 1956 everyone spoke for democratization. But some participants stressed the need for the final overcoming of the consequences of past policies and looked for new ways of socialist development, while others chiefly warned that the enemies could exploit the process of democratization for their own ends. Kazimierz Mijal belonged to the latter group. Although he gave verbal support for the October changes, only a few months later, at the 9th Plenum in May 1957, he severely criticized the new leadership's political line.

According to him, the party had departed from the principle of internationalism, had made concessions for the middle class and had been yielding to the enemy (which was to be manifested in dismissing workers from managerial posts). But the brunt of his attack was directed at agricultural policy. "After the

8th Plenum, the policy of restricting and eliminating capitalist elements from the countryside was practically abandoned," he said. "A shift has been made towards small-scale capitalism in farm production, with all the economic and political consequences which this may involve in the future. The oversimplified explanation that cooperatives broke down only because they had been organized in violation of the volunteer principle does not withstand criticism." Mijal claimed that Polish policies failed to comply with the universal traits of socialist construction. Wladyslaw Gomulka sharply reacted to Mijal's speech. "At that plenum," he said, "there were two reports--one presented by myself on behalf of the Politburo and one by Comrade Mijal. Comrade Mijal's speech represented a different political platform, a different political line."

Gomulka devoted the whole of his summing-up address to a crushing criticism of Mijal's views. He explained the real sense of internationalism and rejected the accusation of his breaking of its principles. "If anybody in this room is attacking us for lack of internationalism, if anybody tries to tell us we are national communists, he is not an internationalist but a flunkey," Gomulka said. He pointed out a number of times that Mijal was practicing demagogical criticism, that he proposed no definite, better measures, for instance with regard to agricultural policy.

"Tell me," he called, "what else can we do. There is nothing in this criticism which would tell us how to resolve our problems more effectively. There is only general instruction that we should work "in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. And this isn't any answer..." Analyzing Mijal's views, Gomulka emphasized their dogmatic character. "It is not true that a view on something should be approved by activists. The point is different; it is necessary that the working class approve of such a view. If it is accepted by the working class, a view which appears to us as sectarian and dogmatic will cease to be sectarian and dogmatic. It isn't so that suddenly sectarianism and dogmatism appeared to us. Sectarianism happens when a small group of people is unable to convey their views and their mentality to the working class and the masses.

Such a group remains alone with its views ... and considers everybody who refuses to accept them as enemies or deserters finding themselves under the enemy's influences." Advising Mijal to present his views to factory workers Gomulka said, "Regrettably, we realized too late that the attitude of the nation must be taken into account. One cannot act against the nation, against a major section of the working class."

Following Gomulka's address, Mijal expressed self-criticism but it soon turned out that his views remained unchanged. On several occasions, particularly after a Moscow meeting of party representatives from the socialist countries held in November 1957, he repeated the same objections to the PZPR policy. Gradually, he was leaving the political scene. He went back to the banking business and became the president of Bank Inwestycyjny.

In the 1960's, when first the Albanian party and next the Chinese were ever more strongly criticizing the development of the international working class movement, Mijal began to look for a new political opportunity. He became a fervent supporter of the anti-Soviet Chinese and Albanian policy. He maintained contacts with those countries' embassies and enjoyed their support. He organized an illegal armchair organization called "The Communist Party of Poland" and appointed himself its general secretary.

On 24 February 1966, the Polish Press Agency issued the following communique, "Last week slanderous, antistate materials were distributed all over the country. It has been found out that this wasn't the first such case and that this time, like before, the texts were printed in Albania. It has also been discovered recently that the Albanian Embassy has gone to the lengths of supplying to Polish citizen Kazimierz Mijal a passport issued to an Albanian citizen who visited Poland from 1 to 15 February. Using this passport, Kazimierz Mijal illegally left Poland."

Radio Tirana offered new opportunities to him. The huge radio station, constructed by the Chinese, broadcast programs in many languages including Polish. The Polish programs were authored by Mijal. Radio Tirana interpreted everything that was happening in Poland as revisionism and deviation from Marxism-Leninism. The only correct Marxism-Leninism was that propounded by Kazimierz Mijal's Communist Party of Poland. Mijal kept writing more and new appeals and versions of his program.

An appeal of 12 April 1981, contained, among other things, an astonishing proposal for resolving the agrarian problem in Poland: "We will create real state farms with an area of 10,000 hectares and 5,000 inhabitants. There will be no private gardens, only colorful blocks of flats, two rooms each. They will have central heating and an oven in each kitchen. There will be two elegant restaurants on the farm with mirrors, carpets, and dance halls; a self-service bar, a cafe, cultural club and a shell of a small church (contributions from the faithful later will be spent on its completion).

The central square will have a fountain in the middle where lights will play at night. There will be benches there and a few trees, a hotel for unmarried people, a machinery and servicing shop, a self-sufficient butcher shop, service shops, dry cleaners, a mangle, barbers, shoemakers, etc. Only flour will be supplied to the shops, but no other products. There will be trucks, one or two tourist buses and one car for the farm's director. The surplus of crops will be sold in the nearest town. The farm will also have a clinic and a ten-grade school. Farmers will not specialize in any particular crops or animals."

On 17 November 1984, after Mijal's arrest, the press published the following communique: "Kazimierz Mijal returned to Poland using a false passport and with the help of a small group of supporters involved himself in illegal activity. When arresting him, the militia uncovered a considerable number of printed materials and manuscripts intended for future publication."

### Mijal's Split With Party

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 49, 1 Dec 84 p 14

[Article by Marian Turski: "Kazimierz Mijal--Godfather of Dogmatism"]

[Excerpts] It seems that Kazimierz Mijal's name has not appeared in the Polish press for about 18 years, since he left Poland with an Albanian passport issued in the name of Mehmetko Servet. But the voice and the views of this man have continued to reach those who listened to Radio Tirana or Radio Peking. It became evident that some people have listened to these programs when "reports" broadcast on them and published in CZERWONY SZTANDAR, which was smuggled into Poland, were repeated in domestic underground publications and leaflets circulated before the 9th PZPR Congress. These "reports" (mainly doctored biographies and calumnies) were issued before the elections of top party authorities, and were intended to discredit those whom the authors of the leaflets said were "liberals," "revisionists," "aliens to the working class and the nation," and "backers of the clergy."

Let us examine Kazimierz Mijal's career. [for the excerpted fragment, see article on Mijal in TU I TERAZ - PNB of 1-3 December - editor's note]

After the 8th PZPR Central Committee Plenum in October 1956, at which Wladyslaw Gomulka was reinstated to the position of PZPR First Secretary, Kazimierz Mijal, found himself outside the main power circuit.

Historians of various orientations unanimously include Mijal in the so-called Natolin group. We are not going to describe or analyze here the origins of the two political orientations which existed in the party leadership at that time. We will just quote the following opinion expressed by Wladyslaw Gomulka during the National Party Activists Conference in Warsaw on 4 November 1956: "Before the 8th Plenum the political differences in the party leadership, i.e., in the Politburo and the Central Committee, boiled down to two fundamental issues--how to approach the issue of Poland's sovereignty and how to interpret the proposed democratization of public life in the socialist system."

In the post-October period, Kazimierz Mijal and those who shared his views alleged that the party leadership was surrendering to "revisionists," "petty bourgeoisie," "renegades," and "the middle class." They increasingly often used the adjectives "Jewish" and "Zionist." They were getting ready to found a party with new leadership, a "left-wing" and "revolutionary" party, which would demand "the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat" in Poland.

The first manifesto published by this group, in 1963, was entitled "To Victory Through Struggle. Passivity and Silence Spell Defeat." According to the group's program, entitled "Struggle for Socialism Under the Banners of Marxism-Leninism," the PZPR leadership had fallen under the control of revisionists, and had "departed from Marxist-Leninist ideology and was intent on restoring capitalism in Poland."

If the information printed in CZERWONY SZTANDAR is precise, in early December 1985, a group of people sharing similar views founded an illegal Communist Party of Poland [KPP]; Kazimierz Mijal became its secretary general.

A year and a half earlier, Wladyslaw Gomulka commented on the operations of this group publicly, though before a limited audience. "A political problem has emerged, so we have to make some things clear," he told the party activists of the Huta Warszawa Steelworks. According to Gomulka, this extreme leftist group was inspired from Albania and China; but "our domestic dogmatists are hiding behind that slander, too." The following is an in extenso quote pertaining to this meeting from "Pages From Wladyslaw Gomulka's Biography" (J. Michasiewicz, W. Namiotkiewicz, article in ZYCIE LITERACKIE No 48/1705):

"May 7, 1964. Gomulka meets party activists of the Huta Warszawa steelworks and delivers a lengthy speech in the production hall of the steelworks. The meeting has been organized in connection with the fact that some workers have been distributing "appeals" and other illegal materials issued by the sectarian and dogmatist Kazimierz Mijal group which calls itself the Communist Party of Poland. Gomulka's speech concerns primarily the ideological content of these attacks against the general political line of the PZPR. At the start, Gomulka quotes the full text of the slanderous 'appeal of the Communist Party of Poland,' which begins with the words: 'Polish workers! You are dumb and stupefied. You have allowed the reactionaries to break you up and push you back to the lowest position in the nation...' The authors of the appeal describe the situation in Poland and claim that power is in the hands of 'functionaries of the degenerated party together with kulaks, Jews, crooks, bureaucrats and priests.' They also warn the working class against a conspiracy of 'the Jewish group, the Zionist bourgeoisie, who, before the war, camouflaged themselves as Polish communists.' The appeal then states that 'Polish workers are the worst paid in the world and their situation has been deteriorating since the notorious Gomulko October.'

The appeal calls for overthrowing the regime of the 'venial Gomulka, who has been selling off our country bit by bit to the Jewish bourgeoisie.' Gomulko also acquaints the audience with other slanderous materials prepared by the so-called KPP. He presents documents testifying to the intentions and designs of the Mijal group. He describes the members of this group, indicating that they are not only implacable and crude dogmatists, but also simply trouble-makers. Some of Mijal's followers were active in the communist movement in the inter-war period, but the movement broke down as a result of repressive measures and started to collaborate with the state police. Gomulka analyzes the ideological content of these materials and answers the accusations contained in them."

During that meeting, Gomulka spoke with great passion and in great pain: "... 'Silence spells defeat.' But who's forcing them to keep silent? Let them speak! But they don't want to speak. They prefer to distribute slanderous materials..." He said the following about Mijal: "He is the director of the Investment Bank; in the past, he was a member of the Central Committee, he was in the government. We dismissed him, but we didn't victimize him. You want to be a director? All right, get down to work. You may be a dogmatist at heart, but you can work as a bank manager. We didn't victimize him, although we could have done so.

"Is that how a party member should behave? Why didn't he turn up at a meeting of his party branch to raise that problem? Simply because he knows very well that he wouldn't receive any support in the party branch; he would be rejected and condemned by everyone for putting the matter in this way--there's so much nonsense, falsehood and trickery in it. He became engrossed in lying. He would have had to say: 'I've told a lie.' I could quote hundreds of his lies right here. His statements teem with lies..."

Replying to the charge that the post-October agricultural policy distorted the socioeconomic system, Gomulka said that at least 90 percent of farm produce was procured by the state and that the state controlled the development of agriculture. "We have all the instruments necessary to guide the development of the countryside and to prevent the emergence of capitalism. The allegation that we are building socialism standing on one foot is dogmatist rubbish," he said.

Since the leftists considered the workers' councils founded after October 1956 to be "instruments for calming down and cheating the working class, modelled on fascist organizations," Gomulka said:

"Workers' self-management has been an object of attacks. I suppose you know perfectly well what the importance of workers' self-management is. I can't speak about it at length now, but it's a form of workers' democracy. To what extent you'll be the masters depends on how you workers avail yourselves of these rights, of these institutional rights that our party has created and granted to the working class. If you can't avail yourselves of these rights, you won't be much of a master. But we're fighting so that you may feel masters of your factories as much as possible."

Another important detail. Gomulka quoted some of the group's internal instructions. The document recommended that representatives of various former orientations in the party should be set at odds and that subversive letters slandering prominent state and party leaders should be circulated. It also recommended the propagation of unrealistic demands in the sphere of housing construction and wages..." Until now we could just smile at this, but now the matter has assumed a new dimension, as that allegedly wronged dogmatist is involved in it," Gomulka said.

The recommendation that state and party leaders should be slandered was systematically carried out at the next stage.

The next stage is connected with Kazimierz Mijal's stay in Albania and China and the inspiration he received there. Let us recall that the early 1960's were a time of open controversy between the Soviet leadership on the one hand and the Albanian leadership and the Mao group on the other. The most important controversial issues were the judgment of Stalin, pronounced by the 20th CPSU Congress, the problem of coexistence of different sociopolitical systems, and the avoidance of a world war, i.e., a nuclear conflict. During the 8th Plenum in 1956, Mijal said: "Our enemies and obscurants have been deliberately exploiting the legitimate process of democratization as a hypocritical guise for anti-Soviet propaganda." However, in the late 1960's CZERWONY SZTANDAR reverberated with the theme of "Soviet socialist-imperialism" and "the counterrevolutionary character of the Soviet leadership." The group's new language was in stark contrast with that it once used. CZERWONY SZTANDAR No 1/1970 wrote about "the Moscow renegades of communism," who had "brought about a political and formal disruption of the whole international revolutionary movement." The new political options of the author (authors?) of these words are evident when he writes that "Moscow has become the center of contemporary revisionism and counterrevolution. The focal point of the world revolution has shifted from Europe to Asia and now the People's Republic of China has become the center of the international proletarian revolutionary and national liberation movement."

The word "now" referred to the great proletarian cultural revolution in China. In another issue (4/1970), the paper said that "after Stalin's death (my emphasis), the Soviet Army ceased to be a military organization executing the political tasks of the revolution."

In the second half of 1978 Mijal moved to the People's Republic of China to take up permanent residence there (he did not side with Albania in the Albanian-Chinese dispute, although he earlier wrote that Albania has the most progressive political system in Europe). He had, however, visited the Far East repeatedly before he moved there for good. The most important of these visits was occasioned by the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the People's Republic of China (October 1969). Mao Zedong and Lin Biao "received the delegation (of the Communist Party of Poland) at the Tienanmen dais in the evening of 1 October and had a photograph taken of them all." (XINHUA News Agency) During another visit, in January 1975, Mijal was received by one of Mao's "gang of four," Yao Wenyuan, and the Peking papers printed excerpts of a telegram congratulating the Chinese leadership on the new Constitution, which had been extended "on behalf of the Polish working class, all working people of Polish People's Republic and the Communist Party of Poland."

But let us go back to Polish affairs. Reading Czerwony Sztandar, one gains the impression that all evil in Poland started from October 1956 or from Stalin's death or, to be precise, from the conference of party activists in November 1954, which denounced the mistakes and distortions which had occurred in the recent past. The list of all quotes on this matter would be the size of a book, so let us just select some quotes for illustration.

"In June 12 years ago, there was rioting in Poznan, and less than 4 months later came the Polish counterrevolutionary October. Poznan was the dress rehearsal for the October counterrevolution." (CZERWONY SZTANDAR No 2/1968).

"The Communist Party of Poland was born of the revolutionary resistance of the working class and the communists' struggle against the renegades of communism against Zambrowski's and Gomulka's ideas. The origin of the Communist Party of Poland should be traced to the first days of the struggle carried on by communists against contemporary revisionists in the defense of the purity of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism proletarian internationalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat in Poland. Polish communists have never endorsed the counterrevolutionary coup d'etat of 1956.

So what should be done to avert the most important danger of revisionism? First of all, we should condemn and reject the resolutions of the 20th CPSU Congress and, secondly, condemn and reject the resolutions of the Polish October." (No 4/1968)

"Gomulka and Zambrowski are the leaders of one and the same gang of Polish and Jewish nationalists. Not only Poland, but also the world, knows that Gomulka came to power owing to a political alliance with Zambrowski. In Warsaw's Saska Kepa District Polish and Jewish nationalities shook hands like brothers and decided to follow the path to capitalism together. For many years these Siamese twins lived in great agreement and friendship and supported each other." (No 1/1968)

Here are some opinions on the socioeconomic system in Poland:

"A major step towards capitalism was taken under the guise of socialism and a planned economy. But then it became impossible to follow the same path any longer. Neither was it possible to remain in the same place, so the decision was made to discard some socialist cliches and take a more determined course towards capitalism. The policy of 'selective development' shows a clear departure from a planned economy and the beginning of the road of development based on the laws of the capitalist economy." (2/1969) The same issue of the paper presents the following statements occasioned by an appraisal of the paper CHLOPSKA DROGA: "Here is the shamelessly praised Gomulka's agricultural policy, a policy of open support for kulaks. CHLOPSKA DROGA, a paper of the PZPR Central Committee, is now an official advocate of capitalist agricultural development. CHLOPSKA DROGA appeals to the worker aristocracy to ally with rich peasants, against the proletariat of towns and the countryside. CHLOPSKA DROGA has betrayed farm cooperatives and has become an organ of the peasant bourgeoisie."

CZERWONY SZTANDAR wrote the following about the Catholic Church:

"The Church in Poland is an undisguised agency of the Vatican; it carries out its tasks in the service of American imperialism to the letter and is--similar to Israel--at the disposal of the big capital." (No 1/1968)

On top of all that, every issue of this paper contains personal insinuations and slander. I suppose we should not repeat them here, for in this way we would give mass circulation to what reached a limited and peculiar group of readers. Incidentally, CZERWONY SZTANDAR has repeatedly called POLITYKA (which it also cites as its source) "a revisionist paper" and "an organ of revisionists."

Naturally, CZERWONY SZTANDAR also presents some accurate critical opinions concerning the state of the economy, the situation of the working class, and mistakes and disparities occurring in Poland. Incidentally, the paper draws many of these observations from the legal press. But c'est le ton qui fait la chanson; in this case it is a tone of demagogic, a tone described by Gomulka, a tone of increasing mania, obsession, and bestial hatred.

The type-written leaflets of the 1980's attack first of all the present party and state leadership and flatter Solidarity. There are also certain indications that in the years 1980-1982 Kazimierz Mijal expected that in the difficult internal situation of those years the PZPR would ask him for cooperation and assistance, that it would call him to their rescue. A friend of Mijal's, a member of the 1950's party leadership, was to mediate. In this way, "the revolutionary Communist Party of Poland" was to find a place for itself within the PZPR."

As you know, neither Solidarity nor the PZPR accepted this offer.

CSO: 2600/459

YUGOSLAVIA

'EGOISM' OF 'REAGANOMICS' SAID TO IMPOVERISH WORLD

Belgrade KOMUNIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jan 85 p 15

[Article by Aleksandr Borcic: "On the Backs of Others"]

[Excerpt] By increasing the budget deficit through borrowing on the capital market, the United States has created its economic recovery largely by seizing capital accumulation also from other countries. Thus the United States, the primary economic power in the world which provides one-third of the total world gross production, has created a way out of the recession largely on the backs of other developed countries of the market economy.

At the same time, Reagan's economic policy has had very serious and dangerous consequences for the developing countries. High interest rates and an overvalued dollar have led developing countries to the edge or ruin.

First the developing countries were offered and given credits under very favorable conditions. By entering the arena of "Reaganomics," credits turned out to be quite a big trap for the developing countries. The increase of interest rates by three to four times compared to those prevailing at the time the loans were taken, along with an ... overvalued dollar, has made it impossible for developing countries to pay off debts.... Reprogramming and refinancing are being carried out, the developing countries are tightening their belts, are becoming poorer, while the debt...continues to grow. Paying off debts has become one of the biggest international problems.

Blinded by some successes of "Reaganomics" in their country, many Americans tend to attribute these successes to "Reaganomics" and the virtues of its creator. They do not understand that what has been achieved has been at the expense of others. And for many Americans the thesis of President Reagan and his staff is very acceptable, namely, that the fate of the developing countries depends on how much they themselves will bring order into their own house. But the fact is that the prescriptions for development are being forced on the developing countries by opening up the door to foreign capital. An economic policy which threatens their independence is being dictated to them by the IMF (International Monetary Fund).

President Reagan cannot be proud of the fact that he has built up American economic imperialism. Supremacy of this country in international economic relations has existed the entire time since the war. It has been identified with the strength of the American economy and the privileges which its dominance in the IMF and the role of the dollar as an international currency gave to the United States. However, it would be difficult to find any postwar American president who, like President Reagan, developed so much national economic egoism. It has largely been due to him that this egoism has become a firm component of a returning American patriotism. More inconsiderate than any of his predecessors, he has taken into consideration only American interests, so economic imperialism has developed into the blackest form. Through abnormally high dollar exchange rates and unprecedented interest rates, the most perfidious plundering in history of the world's poor is taking place under the flag of "Reaganomics."

But the covering of the budget deficit through high interest rates and an over-valued dollar has imposed damage not only on the developing countries but also on the rest of the world market economy. The United States this year will have a market deficit of about \$130 billion and a negative balance of payments with foreign countries of about \$1 billion....

CSO: 2800/174

YUGOSLAVIA

#### HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS EXPLORED

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 411, 20 Oct 84 pp 16, 18

[Article by Slaven Letica: "The Health Bulletin of the Economic Crisis"]

[Text] To what extent will Yugoslavia, because of this year's 60-80 percent inflation rate, get sore throats, acute or chronic neuroses, dermatitis, and hypertension? Do inflation and unemployment determine suicides, murders, traffic accidents, and family violence? In this article, we will attempt to answer the question of how the present economic difficulties are threatening the health of the people, and what can be done to halt this threat or at least moderate it.

For years now, our public has been "upset" from time to time by reports on the shortage of materials for the health industry: medicines, disposable materials, spare parts, and equipment. Such reports have an emotional effect on the public, simply because a shortage of some medicine has more importance for people's lives than a shortage of coffee or heating oil.

The public, however, is aware of the broader features of the effect of the crisis on health. It very often feels it directly, if trouble brings it to some health establishment or pharmacy. The crisis, thus, has threatened health; it has reduced the quality of medical services, and the success of the work of health workers; it has brought health insurance and health establishments to the point of bankruptcy.

But economic difficulties also have an effect (mainly a negative one) on the health of the population. And this fact is escaping the attention of the so-called common man and of the so-called responsible people.

For example, how many years of life, work, and ability to work has Yugoslavia lost? How does the crisis threaten the health of children, the aged, women, men, the poor, the wealthy, officials, the honest and dishonest intelligentsia, the Left and the Right, the employed, the unemployed...?

How many people, because of this year's 60-80 percent rate of inflation, will get sore throats, acute or chronic neuroses, dermatitis, and hypertension? Do inflation and unemployment determine suicides, murders, traffic accidents, and family violence?

These questions may appear unusual to the reader, or not serious.

Unfortunately, the mistake is not in the questions; they simply have to do with the human "cost" of the present situation, and are very common in the literature of modern medical sociology and health economics. The influence of economic difficulties on the mortality, health, and illness of the people were studied seriously for the first time in the 1930's, during the so-called Great Depression. With the appearance of the modern world economic crisis of the 1970's, new research has appeared with methodological refinements and more reliable results, first of all in the United States, Sweden, Canada, Great Britain, and West Germany, and then in other countries as well.

Today, the best-known author of such research is the scientist Dr Harvey Brenner. With a series of so-called longitudinal (i.e., with lengthy monitoring of the changes in economic status and the condition of the health of the same population) and cross-sectoral studies, this author has proven a link between the indicators of economic crisis, on one hand, and the mortality and pathology of the population, on the other. Economic "distress", inflation, and unemployment (these indicators are usually taken as measures of a crisis) govern, first of all, so-called health risk behavior (social isolation, social insecurity, a feeling of being threatened, a decline in one's standard of living, poor nourishment, alcoholism, etc.), and then illness and death.

Crises have been linked in particular to mortality and illness from cardiovascular diseases, cancer (some types), cirrhosis of the liver, traumatism (poisoning, violence), alcoholism, and many neurovegetative diseases.

The forms of the link between "crisis" and "illness" differ depending on people's age, sex, education, occupation, ethnic origin, and other personal characteristics. In addition to these objective characteristics, some so-called "indirect factors" also have an effect. Among these, the following two are dominant: 1) a person's attitude toward work, and 2) the mechanisms for so-called social support (i.e., assistance that an individual can count on from his family, enterprise, or the state). To put it as simply as possible, unemployment, as a rule, does not threaten either the physical or mental health of a person with a negative attitude toward work (according to some research, there are only 2-4 percent of such people in our population). A good system of financial insurance neutralizes illness for people who have a so-called instrumental attitude toward work (who work because of financial or other interest). Unemployment, however, is in any case a threat to the health, particularly the mental health, of people who have a so-called expressive attitude toward work (who experience work as a vital need); believe it or not, such people constitute more than 50 percent of our population.

Stopping at the average level and using the results of Brenner's research (unfortunately, our SIZ's [self-managing interest communities] and unions have neither money for nor interest in similar research), we can say that the crisis's retaining its present dimensions (the unemployment of about a million people, the emigration for economic reasons of 1.2 million, a continuing 5-10 percent drop in the standard of living each year, and 40 percent inflation or higher) will inevitably lead to a change in the pathological picture of the Yugoslav population. Without research, it is difficult to predict precisely the changes that are occurring or that can occur.

But it is known, however, that, for example, the negative effect of unemployment on mental health and social pathology occurs relatively rapidly (with a time "lag" of 6-12 months). The effect of crisis on mortality has many specific characteristics, but it is known that crisis increases mortality from cardiovascular diseases with a "lag" of 3-5 years; with neurovegetative diseases (cirrhosis of the liver, for example), the "lag" is 1-2 years, while with infant mortality, the reaction is immediate (the mortality rate in Yugoslavia has grown from 30 per thousand in 1982 to 31.7 in 1983). As for morbidity, the crisis has a direct effect on almost all illnesses, and all forms of social pathology and a large number of occupational illnesses.

Consequently, 10 years of a decline in the standard of living at the rate of 10 percent per year, for example, would lead to a decrease in the average life expectancy of an individual Yugoslav by about 2-2.5 years, and to an increase of about 50 percent in infant mortality. This means that each year Yugoslavia would lose about 45-55 million years of human lives. The crisis has already increased the temporary inability to work ("sick leave") by about 18 million days per year, and premature invalidism by 5-10 percent.

Unfortunately, the facts I am citing are far from similar to the common man, but also to health workers and others responsible for social policy. But these facts must necessarily be included in a consideration of the future of our medical science. The problems that our medical science (health workers) will encounter in the 1990's, or toward the end of the century, will essentially depend as well on the prices of food and apartments and the number of people unemployed, the state debt... and the general conditions and the way in which the population lives and works. It is necessary to prepare for these new problems: to change the education of doctors, the attitudes of the population toward work and life, etc.

Unfortunately, not only do we know little (and have little interest in learning) about the effect of the crisis on health, but we also know little or nothing about the social differences in the health of our people. For example, how much of a difference is there in the average life expectancy of peasants, metalworkers, cleaners, university professors, and officials? From which illnesses does the working class, or the bureaucracy, suffer and die? Is there more neurosis in the social or private sector? Bitter expert and political debates are conducted over such questions within the framework

of Western theoretical and political systems, and ministers and union presidents are replaced. "Differences in health" are becoming fundamental criteria for measuring social differences and the quality of life of people in general--a measure of social justice and the stability of society. Apparently such questions and discussions do not concern our public (or policy). Unfortunately, without them it is not possible to define an adequate health policy in the long run. More precisely, health "policy" and discussions exhaust themselves in antisocial "ideological" subjects like "Health care at the service of associated labor: Yes or No," "The private sector: Yes or No," and so forth.

What is most interesting is that many of our publications contain research that makes it possible to draw a general picture of the gender, ethnic, class, regional, and other differences in the health of our people. This possible picture, however, would perhaps not suit our ideological ideas about what is desirable, possible, and realistic. Possibly the public (the "nondelegate" public) would get "upset"; just as the so-called black report on the social differences in the health of blacks and whites, males and females, the poor and the rich, and the English, Scots, and Welsh shook Great Britain in 1980. It is considered normal that the public knows that the (average) wage of cleaners is 200 percent less than the director's, but not that the mortality of its infants is twice as high and its life expectancy is 3-5 years less. Because of limited space, this article will limit itself just to some general indicators of our people's state of health.

It should be stated at once that with respect to all the health indicators, we are neither in last nor in next to the last place in Europe (we are "saved" by Albania). With an infant mortality of 31.7 per thousand in 1983 (and a range from 15.8 per thousand in Slovenia to 71.7 per thousand in Kosovo), we are in last place in Europe (Sweden, for example, has 6.7; the Netherlands, 8.6; although, in contrast to us, the births are handled by midwives, and 50 percent of the births are in the houses of the parents). While we are still an undeveloped country in terms of infant mortality, in the structure of the causes of death we have approached the developed industrial countries. For example, in 1980 49.6 percent of the people died from diseases of the heart and arteries, 14.9 percent from cancer and related diseases, 6.9 percent from injuries, accidents, and poison, and 6.3 percent from respiratory diseases (all other diseases: 22.3 percent).

We stand a little better with respect to the indicator of life expectancy. The life expectancy for 1-year-old children in Yugoslavia (1981 data) is 73.2 for women, and 67.7 for men (which means that women, although discriminated against, nevertheless "live longer" by about 5 years). The Japanese have the longest life expectancy in the world: 79 years for women and 74 for men (instructive data, if it is known that objectively the Japanese work hardest, but in other indicators as well the health of their people is in first place in the world).

The length of life in Yugoslavia is not quite in accordance with our level of development. Specifically, the longest life expectancy is that of women

in Montenegro (76.3 years), and the shortest is that of men in Croatia (66.7 years) and Slovenia (66.8 years).

Our public's ideas about the distribution of diseases and health risks are completely distorted. Literature and journalism have celebrated some diseases of the middle class so much that the common man believes, for example, that politicians, artists, and intellectuals in general become ill and die exclusively from heart attacks, strokes, carcinoma, ulcers, diabetes, neurosis, alcoholism... In reality, quite different social and professional groups become ill and die from these diseases considerably more often.

According to the excellent research by Mimica, Saric, Malinar and their colleagues in 1977, as much as 45 percent of peasants, 40 percent of unskilled workers, 15 percent of officials, and only 5 percent of intellectuals suffered from chronic alcoholism. Intellectuals suffered the least from heart attacks and heart disease in general (3.4 percent), while peasants and unskilled workers suffered the most (over 7 percent). Neuroses were most frequently observed in retirees (30 percent) and unskilled workers, and most rarely in officials (15 percent) and intellectuals (16 percent). Only hemorrhoids were a typical official-intellectual disease: 85 percent of officials and 16 percent of intellectuals suffer from them, and only 7 percent of peasants.

The public (and unfortunately the professional public as well) usually has mistaken ideas about distribution by gender of diseases. A mistaken ideology and practice of "protecting" the health of women and men is then linked to these mistaken ideas.

In a discussion a few years ago, I called the ruling concept of the so-called specific health protection for women in Yugoslavia "vaginocentrism" (see "On the Vaginocentric Concept of Women's Health and the Pathology of Emancipation," in the journal ZENA, No 4-5, 1980).

In fact, although for a long time women's reproductive organs have not been their main organs facing a health threat (and when they are, they are threatened by cancer and other "modern", not traditional, diseases), the specific protection of women is still limited to gynecological-obstetric protection. Such a concept of the specific protection of women was understandable at a time when women's health problems in connection with their reproductive function were dominant in the overall pathology of women. Women carried and gave birth to children virtually throughout their entire fertile period, the mortality of infants and small children was high (over 120 per thousand), and women's mortality associated with pregnancy and birth was high.

Women's modern health problems are "moving" toward the brain, heart, and circulatory system, cancer and other tumors, and the neurovegetative system. The differences in the pathology of men and women are still great and justify the terms male and female pathology. We will cite a few typically "male" and typically "female" diseases.

The female diseases, for example, are obesity, from which 37 percent of women (and 21 percent of men) suffer, neuroses (women 28 percent, men 20 percent), swollen veins (women 32 percent, men 17 percent), gallstones (women 9.5 percent, men 2 percent), chronic inflammation of the intestines (women 12 percent, men 8 percent), rheumatism of the spine (25 to 19 percent), etc.

The male diseases are chronic alcoholism (men 25 percent, women 4 percent), chronic bronchitis (30 to 15 percent), chronic inflammation of the stomach and ulcers (men 24 percent, women 15 percent), liver damage (men 15 percent, women 6 percent), etc.

Even the layman can conclude that the pathology of the man is associated with his "emancipation" and the outside world: alcohol, smoking, driving, working. Women's pathology is a pathology of too much standing and working, the kitchen and monotony.

But what will happen with pathology when women and men finally achieve full emancipation, i.e., when women begin to smoke, drink, work, and serve in the armed forces on an equal basis, and men begin to cook? But that is precisely the activist ideal of the women's movement. Something will happen, and that has to be taken into account.

The great changes in health levels brought by the economic crisis and modern sociocultural development have caused great changes in the ideology and practice of health protection. What changes are taking place in our country? None, unfortunately. Our medical science and health protection practice (not theory) are still governed by diagnostic-therapeutic nihilism.

It can be seen best, perhaps, in the way that health and medicine are written and spoken about in the mass media. Let us take television as an example. While British or American television, for example, have for about 10 years been devoting their prime time to programs for relaxation, stress-management, the culture of food and physical activities, our television films the kind of programs that were in fashion on British and American television 20 years ago--programs that glorify and make a mystery of medical technology and subspecialized (so-called scientific) medicine, programs that maintain an unreasonable medical and state paternalism in views of health protection.

It is therefore not surprising that in the last 10 years, in all the West European countries there has been a freeze on investments in new hospital beds, and that in the same period there was an investment boom in hospital construction in Yugoslavia. Elsewhere in the world, modern medical science is increasingly emphasizing the so-called ecological-postindustrial scenario for protecting and promoting health, instead of the technological one.

In the last 10 years, many new terms have appeared in the area of social medicine and public health, such as "positive health", "health development", "lifestyles", "holistic health", "lay medicine", "self-protection", and "health promotion".

The term/concept of "health promotion" has emerged in the last 5-6 years as a sort of generic term that most adequately expresses this new philosophy or new paradigm of health policy. This new term/concept originally appeared in North America in the 1960's, precisely on the fringes of a great economic crisis and a crisis in medical science. It built its image on large campaigns for jogging, mass sports activities... a healthy way of life. It therefore met strong criticism, which came from Left-oriented theoreticians. The thesis on which the criticism was based acted suggestively: in order to reduce state expenditures for health, the new conservative bourgeois state (which replaces the so-called welfare state) requires a campaign for self-protection and reforming "lifestyles".

Europe consequently viewed the concept of "health promotion" with skepticism. At the same time, in North America this "campaign for health" gave contradictory, but on the whole positive results. Specifically, since the large cities were not adapted for mass running and bicycling, there was a growth in the number of traffic accidents; but there was also a substantial reduction in mortality and illness from diseases of the heart and circulatory system.

Through several activities of the European Office of the World Health Organization from 1980 to 1984, the concept of "health promotion" has been gaining legitimacy in Europe, and it should constitute one of the strategic directions for the development of health in the decades to come. Why, then, is Europe (unfortunately, not Yugoslavia) adopting the concept of "health promotion"?

Although the concept itself is still in a phase of intellectual, theoretical, and political conceptualization, its basic ideas can already be clearly outlined today.

The paradigm of "Western medicine" in the period from the 1930's to the 1980's was part of the paradigm, today already "obsolete", of the classical policy of the welfare state: the socialization of the economic risks of disease and the scientific-technological production of health services.

This medicine is absolutely dominated by the "disease model"; disease is the fundamental criterion of the overall policy: the prevention of disease, the rehabilitation of the diseased, insurance in case of disease, compensation for economic losses because of disease, etc. The concept of "health promotion" does not deny the importance of disease, but it requires a radical orientation of medicine and social policy toward health: "discovering" health and its determinants, measuring health, and improving health.

The center of interest of this new concept is positive health as a biological, mental, social, psychological, and human entity. Not as some ideal health, but the health possessed by a person who lives with "diagnoses".

The questions that the concept of "health promotion" seeks an answer to are: What is (positive) health in general? What factors and circumstances determine it? Can it be measured, and how? And most important: How can it be promoted?

As I. Levin wittily says, this is a concept that discovers health as the most convenient mass "disease" and that then requires medical science, social policy, and people as individuals to promote this "disease" by all available means. In contrast to many other new concepts that are only intellectually and socially provocative (for example, the quality of life, health conduct, etc.), the concept of "health promotion" requires action, mass action in which people, athletic societies, the food industry, schools, the mass media, recreational establishments, industry, etc., participate. People's health is achieved through "campaigns": food, giving up smoking, a healthy working and living environment, running, exercise, hygiene, and healthy political and social conditions.

All of these activities must receive absolute priority in the system and policy of financing health "protection", in the practice of the "popularization of medicine" (especially on television), in the system for the education of children, young people, etc. Naturally, such activities also require a reorientation of health care. What kind? That is a subject for some future discussion. For now, it is sufficient to say that many parts of the current doctrine on "health care at the service of associated labor" require a fundamental reform.

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YUGOSLAVIA

## SELF-MANAGEMENT LAW TERMED INEFFECTIVE

[Editorial Report] An article in the 29-30 December 1984 issue of BORBA (Belgrade, p 11) reports on a study made over several years by Ivica Colak, a young Zrenjanin legal scholar, on the ineffectiveness of the self-management law, which he says is in a "big crisis," adding that "things are no better in regard to our legal system in general.... The failure to respect general self-management regulations is so obvious that one no longer asks whether the law is effective...." Changes in this law are necessary if it is to continue to exist, Colak says, noting that one of the major drawbacks is the lack of sanctions or ineffectiveness of sanctions in the law. "A special problem is the method of guaranteeing sanctions in the self-management law by the state -- sanctions which the self-management organizations cannot carry out against violators because the violators are so powerful that they can bar the application of sanctions. It is a question, namely of the economic power of violators and the reputation which they enjoy in the areas where they live and work...."

Another problem lies, Colak says, in whether the provisions of the self-management law are appropriate to the realities of society. "In organizations of associated labor [OURs] general self-management regulations are enacted without analyzing the relations in the basic organizations of associated labor. So it is not strange when these regulations cannot be implemented...." But he concludes it is necessary to stress that the ineffectiveness of the self-management law cannot be attributed only to poor legal, technical, and substantive formulation of the provisions of this law. Although the apologists for the law say this, a deeper cause is the "irreconcilable conflict of interest between the bureaucracy and direct producers which is manifested in various ways in the ineffectiveness of this law. The bureaucracy is still very powerful and can oppose and even overpower the interests of direct producers."

CSO: 2800/165

YUGOSLAVIA

'BORBA' PUBLISHES REFUTATION OF SUVAR ARTICLE

[Editorial Report] The 26 and 27 December 1984 issues of BORBA (Belgrade, pages 5, respectively) publish a 2-part piece by Dr Dragan Veselinov taking issue with Stipe Suvar's article (in BORBA, 10-13 December 1984) which opposed "liberal" views of the stabilization program and the need for political and economic changes in the system. Besides ridiculing Suvar's utopianism and his belittling of market forces, Veselinov rejects the dominant position Suvar allegedly assigns to the LCY as monolithic arbiter over science. "The elimination of political factions does not mean the political right to doctrinaire orthodoxy of a sect. The Yugoslav Communists do not kneel before "Zinoviev," ...The party of our communists is not a church, and science is not subordinate to the party," he says.

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